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Abstract: The last decade has brought about substantial mortgage innovation and increased refinancing. 
The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants and implications of mortgage choice in the 
context of a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. The equilibrium characterization allows 
us to study the impact of mortgage financing decisions in the productive economy. We show the influence 
of different contract characteristics such as the down payment requirement, repayment structure, and the 
amortization schedule for mortgage choice. We find that loan products that allow for low or no down 
payment or an increasing repayment schedule increase the participation of young and lower-income 
households. We find evidence that the volume of housing transactions increases when the payment profile 
is increasing and households have little housing equity. In contrast, we show that loans that allow for a 
rapid accumulation of home equity can still have positive participation effects without increasing the 
volatility of the housing market. The model predicts that the expansion of mortgage contracts and 
refinancing improves risk sharing opportunities for homeowners, but the magnitude varies with each 
contract. 
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Housing is important for both households and the aggregate economy. At the macro level,
housing investment (both residential and nonresidential structures) accounts for about half of
all gross private investment. The importance of housing at the household level is more evident
since the purchase of a house is typically the largest single consumer transaction. Since houses
are expensive, the availability of housing ﬁnance is equally important. From an aggregate
perspective, approximately eight trillion dollars in mortgage debt is allocated to the ﬁnancing
of housing. For the household, the mortgage decision has implications for expenditure patterns
and asset allocations. Recent events have increased the role of housing and mortgage ﬁnance in
the economy. This is especially apparent given the crisis in the subprime mortgage market. The
ﬁnancial turbulence resulting from this problem has preoccupied traders in the ﬁnancial markets
and policymakers, because of the potential consequences for the performance of the aggregate
economy.
There is relatively little research on mortgage choice that examines the ramiﬁcations of that
choice for both households and the aggregate economy. There is a large literature on mortgage
choice in the ﬁnance literature.1 This literature mainly focuses on the choice between adjustable
rate and types of ﬁxed rate mortgages. These papers include, Alm and Follain (1984), Dunn and
Spatt (1985), Kearl (1979), LeRoy (1996), Stanton and Wallace (1999), and Shilling, Dhillon, and
Sirmans (1987). More recently, Campbell and Cocco (2003) examine the role mortgage choice
in the household risk management problem. They analyze the between ﬁxed and adjustable
rate mortgages in the context of a partial equilibrium dynamic life-cycle model with borrowing
constraints and income risk. Given their focus, they do not consider the diﬀerent dimensions of
mortgages or the implications for the aggregate economy.
Given an array of mortgage products, the optimal mortgage choice for a household is a
complex problem. Households have to take into consideration many dimensions such as the
downpayment, maturity of the contract, repayment structure, the ability to reﬁnance, the pos-
sibility of being subject to borrowing constraints, and the evolution of economic variables such
as the interest rate, inﬂation, house appreciation and income growth. For instance, the optimal
choice for a buyer moving into the housing market might be diﬀerent than a homeowner looking
to upsize. Therefore, understanding mortgage decisions requires a framework that explicitly
acknowledges the heterogeneity of households along the age, income, and wealth dimensions.
In addition, these decisions must consider the complexities of the tax code that favors owner-
occupied housing with the deductibility of mortgage interest payments and the lack of taxation
from the imputed rental income for homeowners. Only in such a framework might we be able to
understand the observed mortgage choice across households and its impact in the performance
of the overall economy.
The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of mortgage choice and the
implications of these choices for the economy in the context of a general equilibrium model.
1Follain (1990) has written a survey of this literature prior to 1990.
2The equilibrium characterization is particula r l yi m p o r t a n tb e c a u s ei ta l l o w su st os t u d yt h e
impact of mortgage ﬁnancing decisions in the productive economy. We solve for equilibrium
using a restricted subset of mortgage choices that are not subject to interest rate risk. This
limitation does not seem to be major as more than 90 percent of the households use loans with
ﬁxed interest rates. The failure to consider variable interest rate products could be important
for reﬁnancing. A key determinant of mortgage decisions is the set of loan products available
to households. Until the 1990s there were two predominant loan types: an adjustable rate
mortgage (ARM) and a 30 year ﬁxed rate mortgage (FRM).2 However, in the last decade there
has been substantial innovation in mortgage markets that has substantially expanded the set of
loan products making the choice of mortgage even more complex. These new loan products have
changed the nature of the conventional 30 year ﬁxed rate mortgage by eliminating the presence
of downpayment constraints and allowing the repayment structure to change over the length of
the mortgage. The result is that the introduction of these products has increased opportunities
for families that otherwise might be unable to buy a house.
To understand the determinants of housing ﬁnance we develop a quantitative equilibrium
theory of mortgage choice to investigate the impact of housing tenure (renting vs. owning), as
well as the ramiﬁcations on the asset allocation in the households’ portfolio (ﬁnancial assets vs.
housing). In the model households face uninsurable mortality and labor income risks and make
decisions with respect to consumption (goods and housing services), and asset allocation (capital
and risky housing investment).3 The model stresses the dual role of housing as a consumption
and risky investment good. Investment in housing diﬀers from real capital since it requires a
long-term mortgage loan. Households can choose from a menu of mortgage contracts that diﬀer
in downpayment requirement, payment schedule, and maturity so in equilibrium diﬀerent long-
term mortgage loans coexist. House sales are subject to an idiosyncratic capital gains shock
that aﬀects the value of the property.4 Since households are subject to uninsurable income risk,
we also consider an economy where we allow them to reﬁnance the terms of the contract. The
introduction of mortgage decisions introduce important computation complexity so it becomes
infeasible to allow household to choose over a large set of mortgage products, but it is feasible
to examine a restrictive set of mortgage products.
In recent years, there has been a number of papers that examined housing in a general equi-
2Campbell and Cocco (2003) use a quantitative model of mortgage choice to study the determinant between
ARMs and FRMs. They show that ARMs should be attractive to unconstrained households when inﬂation risk is
large relative to interest rate risk, and they should be unattractive to risk averse borrowing constrained households.
However, they claim that their theory fails to rationalize the observed mortgage holdings in periods with high
spreads.
3It is important to note that in an environment with complete markets mortgage decisions are irrelevant.
Households can always oﬀset any limitation of the mortgage loan (i.e. downpayment requirement) by borrowing
or lending in the asset market. Mortgage choice is meaningful in an environment with incomplete markets and
with borrowing constraints.
4There has been a lot of discussion about the high growt hr a t e so fh o u s ep r i c e so v e rt h es a m et i m ep e r i o d .I n
this paper we do not seek to explain the joint movement of house price and homeownership. The introduction of
idiosyncratic capital gains has the objective of partially capturing the risk associated to investing in real estate
upon the sale of the property.
3librium framework with heterogeneous agents. Some of these papers are Berkovec and Fuller-
ton (1992), Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2007a), Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2002),
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002), Gervais (2002), Jeske and Krueger (2005), Li and
Yao (2007), Nakajima (2003), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Sánchez (2007), Sánchez-Marcos
and Ríos-Rull (2006). Much of this literature looks at the taxes eﬀects on housing choice or the
wealth implications of housing. The papers most related to this paper are Jeske and Krueger who
examine the role of Government-Sponsored Enterprises for housing and the macroeconomy, and
Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2007a) which tries to account for changes in homeown-
ership in the United States. The emphasis is on decomposing the observed boom in real estate
into demographic changes, mortgage innovation, and joint eﬀects. We ﬁnd that roughly one
third of the increase can be attributed to demographic factors, and the remaining to mortgage
innovation and joint eﬀects. Although the papers share a similar methodology and framework,
this paper focuses on the determinants of mortgage decisions and their implications for the ag-
gregate economy. We explore many dimensions of mortgage contracts such as the repayment
schedule, downpayment, amortization, and reﬁnancing that impact mortgage choice, as well as
housing tenure, duration, risk sharing decisions.
We can segment the primary ﬁndings in the paper into ﬁve categories.
• Aggregate eﬀects: The model predicts that the introduction of mortgage decisions has
a positive eﬀect on ownership and housing consumption but the magnitude depends on the
proﬁle of the repayment schedule and the downpayment. We ﬁnd that the introduction of
nontraditional loans with an increasing repayment proﬁle have similar aggregate eﬀects as
loans with no downpayment and decreasing repayments, but the distributional eﬀects on
participation and housing transactions are diﬀerent. We show that the aggregate eﬀects
are maximized with loans that combine high loan-to-value ratios with low initial mortgage
costs. The introduction of nontraditional loans have positive eﬀects on output, but the
increase in output only translates in an important increase in consumption when the income
eﬀects are large. Otherwise, only the average house size increases in a signiﬁcant way.
• Distributional eﬀects: When we study the determinants of mortgage choice, we ﬁnd
that the decisions are inﬂuenced through three dimensions: the downpayment constraint,
the repayment proﬁle, and the amortization schedule. In terms of age and income the
model suggests a certain separation of mortgage decisions. For example, when downpay-
ment requirements are high, young and poor individuals beneﬁt from using mortgage loans
with steep repayment proﬁle since it reduces the initial cost of purchase a house. Indi-
viduals with more income or older age prefer mortgages with high downpayment and fast
amortization of the principal. A very close substitute to loans with increasing repayment
schedules for young and poor individuals are loans with no downpayment and decreasing
repayments. When we explore the determinants of downpayment choice we ﬁnd that the
standard 20 percent downpayment is a compromise between 57 percent of the homeowners
that prefer a larger downpayment and 36 percent that prefer a lower one.
4• Mobility: The introduction of nontraditional loans with low initial payments, low down-
payments, or both increase the number of transactions in and out of the housing market
with respect to the baseline model. For example, in the baseline model there is a relation
around 4 to 1 between renters that move into ownership and homeowners that have to sell
the house and rent. With the introduction of these low ﬁnancing products this relation
is close to one. The distributional impact on mobility between low initial payment and
no downpayment are very diﬀerent. Loans with low initial costs generate a decreasing
distribution by age of individuals leaving the housing market, whereas contracts with no
downpayment exhibit a humped-shaped pattern.
• Consumption smoothing of mortgage choice: In general, we ﬁnd that the introduc-
tion of mortgage choice improves consumption smoothing because it reduces the coeﬃcient
of variation of consumption for homeowners. The reduction is specially important for con-
tracts that allow for a steep proﬁle of repayment and/or a low downpayment.
• Reﬁnancing: Finally, we show that the introduction of a reﬁnancing option increases the
participation rate and the average house size. It also reduces the number of transactions
in the housing market when compared to the baseline without reﬁnancing. We also show
that given our speciﬁcation of preferences, reﬁnancing reduces the coeﬃcient of variation
of housing services, but does not aﬀect the variability of consumption.
Beyond policy implications, this paper ﬁlls a few important gaps in the modeling of the
housing market. First, we employ a model which explicitly models mortgage decisions using
contracts which last for several periods. The fact that houses are typically purchased through
long duration mortgages is often avoided in other life-cycle models with housing. These long
duration loans will have an eﬀect on households ability to accumulate capital assets and smooth
income risk. Second, we implement an endogenous rental market where supply and demand is
completely driven by household decisions. As a result, we ﬁnd that our model matches several
features of the housing market including: the rate of homeownership, the average house and
apartment size, and the age distribution of landlords just to name a few. Thus, we have a
developed a model that can be used to address several additional questions about housing.
This paper is organized into ﬁve sections. In the ﬁrst section, we describe the properties of
diﬀerent mortgage contracts. In the second section, we describe the model economy and deﬁne
equilibrium. The third section discusses the estimation of the model to the US economy. The
next section analyzes the performance of the model with a standard mortgage contract, while
the ﬁnal section examines the implications of alternative mortgage contracts.
2. Mortgage Contracts
2.1. Characteristics of mortgage contracts
A mortgage contract is a loan secured by real property. Mortgage lending is the primary mech-
anism used in most countries to ﬁnance the acquisition of residential property. These loans are
5structured as long-term loans that require periodic payments consisting of an interest payment
and a principal payment. There are many types of mortgage loans which can be broadly deﬁned
by three main characteristics: the payment structure, the amortization schedule, and the term
of the mortgage loan. The payment structure deﬁnes the amount and the frequency of mortgage
payments. The amortization structure refers to the size of the principal payments over the life of
the mortgage. This schedule diﬀers across mortgage loans and it can be increasing, decreasing,
or constant. Some contracts allow for no amortization of the principal and full repayment of
principal at a given date. Other contracts allow negative amortization usually in the initial
periods of the loan. The term or duration usually refers to the maximum length of time given
to repay the mortgage loan. The most common durations are 15 and 30 years. In theory, the
combination of these three factors allows a large variety of distinct mortgage products to be
constructed. Among these, only a subset of products exist in the marketplace.
Understanding mortgage loans is essential to understanding owner-occupied housing. In
the United States, according to the Residential Finance Survey in 2001, roughly 97 percent of
the housing units where purchased through mortgage loans while only 1.6 percent were pur-
chased with cash. Between 1995 and 2005, a substantial change occurred in the structure of the
mortgage market in the United States. According to data presented in the Mortgage Market
Statistical Annual, the market share of nontraditional mortgage contracts has increased since
2000. Nontraditional or alternative mortgage products include interest-only loans, option ARMs,
loans that couple extended amortization with balloon payment requirements and other contracts
of alternative lending. For example, in 2004 these products accounted for 12.5 percent of the
originations. By 2006, the fraction increased to 32.1 percent of new originations. With the
share of conventional and conforming loans declining, it is important to examine the structure
of mortgage contacts.
2.2. General structure of mortgage contracts
Despite the diﬀerences in the observed types of mortgage contracts, all of them have the same
fundamental elements: a downpayment, an amortization schedule, an interest payment, and
outstanding principal. To characterize the various features of mortgage contracts it is useful to
introduce some general notation common to all contracts. Let z ∈ Z = {1,...,Z} be a speciﬁc
type of mortgage loan from the set of available contracts that borrowers can use to purchase
a house of size h with a unit price p. A mortgage loan usually requires a downpayment to
guarantee that there is some equity in the house. We deﬁne χ(z) ∈ R to be the fraction of the
house value paid up-front by the homeowners. The term H0(z)=χ(z)ph represents the initial
amount of equity in the house and D0(z)=( 1−χ(z))ph represents the initial debt owed to the
lender. At each period, t, the borrower faces a payment amount that depends on the size of
the loan, D0(z), the term of the mortgage, N(z), the mortgage loan interest rate, rm(z), and
repayment structure associated to each mortgage contract z. We denote the mortgage repayment
schedule at time t as being determined by the function mt(x,z) where x is deﬁn e db yt h es e t
(p,h,χ(z),N(z),rm(z)). This payment can be decomposed into an amortization term, At(z),
6that depends on the amortization schedule of the mortgage loan and an interest term, It(z),
that depends on the outstanding debt. That is,
mt(x,z)=At(z)+It(z), ∀t, (2.1)
where the interest payments are calculated by It(z)=rm(z)Dt(z). The law of motion for the
level of housing debt Dt(z) can be written as,
Dt+1(z)=Dt(z) − At(z), ∀t. (2.2)
The law of motion for the level of home equity with respect to the loan Ht(z) is
Ht+1(z)=Ht(z)+At(z), ∀t, (2.3)
where H0(z)=χ(z)ph denotes the home equity in the initial period.
Notice that this formulation is very general since it allows a 100 percent ﬁnancing when
χ(z)=0with a initial loan of D0(z)=ph, and all cash purchase with χ(z)=1with no
initial loan D0(z)=0 . Some contracts even allow closing costs to be rolled into the loan, so
the downpayment fraction could be negative, χ(z) < 0. Next, we will discuss the speciﬁcs of
primary mortgage contract types such as the standard ﬁxed rate mortgage (FRM), a constant
amortization loan (CAM), a balloon payment loan, combo-loans with a ﬁnanced downpayment
(COM), and graduated mortgage payments (GPM).
2.3. Fixed Rate Mortgage
Fixed rate mortgages (FRM) are considered the “standard” loan product used to ﬁnance the
purchase a house. This loan product is characterized by a constant mortgage payment over the
term of the mortgage, m(x,zFRM)=m1(x,zFRM)=... = mN(x,zFRM). The constant mortgage
payment results in an increasing amortization schedule of the principal and a decreasing schedule




where λ = rm[1−(1 + rm)−N]−1. Since the outstanding debt decreases over time, D0(zFRM) >
... > DN(zFRM), the contract front loads the interest rate payments It(zFRM)=rm(zFRM)Dt(zFRM),
and back loads the capital or principal payments given by
At(zFRM)=λD0(zFRM) − rm(zFRM)Dt(zFRM).
7The level of debt is reduced by the repayment each period
Dt+1(zFRM)=( 1+rm)Dt(zFRM) − m(x,zFRM), ∀t, (2.5)
and the equity in the house increases each period by the mortgage payment net of interest.Ht+1(zFRM)=
Ht(zFRM)+[ m(x,zFRM) − rm(zFRM)Dt(zFRM)], ∀t.
2.4. Constant Amortization Mortgage
One of the features of the ﬁxed rate mortgage is that households accrue little equity early
in the mortgage due the front loaded interest payments. A contract that does not have this
unattractive feature is the constant amortization mortgage (CAM). This loan product assumes
constant contributions to the amortization schedule, At(zCAM)=At+1(zCAM)=A(zCAM), but
since the interest repayment schedule depends on the size of outstanding level of debt, Dt(zCAM),
and the loan term, N, the mortgage payments mt(x,zCAM) are no longer constant. Formally,























2.5. Balloon and Interest Only Mortgages
At the other end of the spectrum we have mortgage contracts with very little or no amortization
along the term of the mortgage. One example is the balloon loan (BAL) where all the principal
b o r r o w e di sp a i di nf u l lt h el a s tp e r i o d ,N. This product is popular in times where mortgage
rates are high and home buyers anticipate lower future mortgage rates. In addition, homeowners
who expect to stay in their home for a short duration may ﬁnd this attractive because the lack





(1 − χ)ph t = N
.
8All the mortgage payments, except the last one, reﬂect interest rate payments It (zBAL)=




(1 + rm)D0(zBAL) t = N
,






The other example is the interest only loan, (BALI). With this mortgage contract the home-
owner never accrues more equity in the house that the initial downpayment. In this case,
At(zBALI)=0and mt(x,zBALI)=It(zBALI)=rmD0(zBALI) for all t. With this mortgage the
homeowner is eﬀectively renting the property from the lender and the interest payments are the
eﬀective rental cost.
With these two type of mortgage loans since there is no additional equity is accrued in
the property the mortgage payments are the lowest. In this situation, the homeowner is fully
levered with the bank and maximizes the return from housing investment when capital gains are
realized. In the presence of mortgage interest deductions this contract becomes very attractive
since the government subsidizes all your eﬀective rental cost.
2.6. Graduate Mortgage Payments
In an environment with high housing prices, another product that may be of interest to ﬁrst
time buyers is the graduated payment mortgage (GPM) where mortgage payments grow over
time. This product could be attractive to ﬁrst time buyers as mortgage payments are initially
lower than payments in a standard contract. With this contract, mortgage payments increase
with income over time keeping housing expenses stable as a fraction of income. Of course, this
product increases the lender’s risk exposure because the borrower builds equity in the home
at a slower rate than the standard contract which may explain the lack of popularity of this
product.5 The repayment schedule depends on the growth rate of these payments. We consider
two diﬀerent cases that diﬀer on the growth rate of mortgage payments.
1. Geometric Growth: In this type of contract, mortgage payments evolve according to a
constant geometric growth rate given by
mt+1(x,zGPMG)=( 1+g)mt(x,zGPMG),
5In 1974 Congress authorized an experimental FHA insurance program for GPM’s. In this program, negative
amoritization was permitted, but required higher downpayments so that the outstanding principal balance would
never be greater during the life of the mortgage than would be permitted for a standard mortgage insured by
FHA. Activity under this program and successor programs has been limited.
9where g>0. Consequently, the amortization term and interest payments are also growing.
Formally,
mt(x,zGPMG)=At(zGPMG)+It(zGPMG),
with the initial mortgage payments being,
m0(x,zGPMG)=λgD0(zGPMG),
where λg =( rm − g)[1 − (1 + rm)−N]−1. The law of motion for the level of debt satisﬁes
Dt+1(zGPMG)=( 1+rm(zGPMG)Dt(zGPMG) − (1 + g)tm0(x,zGPMG),
and the amortization term is At(zGPMG)=λgD0(zGPMG) − rmDt(zGPMG).
2. Arithmetic Growth: In this case, the mortgage payment grows at a constant nominal
amount 4 = m1(x,zGPMA)−m0(x,zGPMA). The law of motion for the repayment schedule
is
mt+1(x,zGPMA)=m0(x,zGPMA)+t ·4 ,









The law of motion for the outstanding debt is
Dt+1(zGPMA)=( 1+rm)Dt(zGMPA) − (m0(x,zGPMA)+t ×4 ).
In this case the amortization term is At =( m0(x)+t ×4 ) − rmDt.
2.7. Combo or Piggyback Loan
In the late 1990’s the combo or Piggyback loan, (COM), became a popular loan product as way
to avoid large downpayment requirements and personal mortgage insurance (PMI).6 This loan
product amounts to the use two diﬀerent loans. The primary loan covers a fraction of the total
purchase, D1(zCOM)=( 1− χ)ph, with a payment schedule, m1
t(x,zCOM), and maturity, N1.
The second loan partially or fully covers the downpayment amount, D2(zCOM)=κχph,w h e r e
κ ∈ (0,1] and represents the fraction of downpayment ﬁnanced by the second loan. The second
loan has an interest premium rm
2 = rm
1 + ζ (where ζ>0), a mortgage payment m2
t(x,zCOM),
6Government sponsored mortgage agencies initiated the use of this product in the late 1990’s and this product
became popular in private mortgage markets between 2001 and 2002.





m1(x,zCOM)+m2(x,zCOM) when N2 ≤ t ≤ N1
m1(x,zCOM) when t<N 2
,
the laws of motion for both loans, and home equity are computed as in the mortgage with
constant repayment. There are diﬀerent type of combo loans oﬀered in the industry, for example
a “80-15-5” implies a primary loan for 80 percent of the value, a secondary loan for 15 percent,
and a 5 percent downpayment. Another special case is the so-called “no downpayment” or a
“80-20-0” that corresponds to the traditional loan-to-value rate of 80 percent using a second
loan for the 20 percent downpayment.
3. Equilibrium Model of Mortgage Choice
The model economy is comprised of households, a representative ﬁrm, a ﬁnancial intermediary
and a government sector. In this section, we discuss each of these elements in detail as and
deﬁne the market clearing conditions. The formal deﬁnition of the recursive equilibrium for this
model appears in an appendix.
3.1. Households
The household sector is populated by overlapping generations of ex-ante identical households
that face mortality risk and uninsurable labor earning uncertainty. Household age is denoted
by j where each household lives a maximum of J periods. The survival probability conditional
of being alive at age j is given by ψj+1 ∈ [0,1], with ψ1 =1 , and ψJ+1 =0 . Preferences are
deﬁned over consumption goods c and housing services s. Bundles of goods are ranked according
to an index function u : R2
+ → R. The function u(c,s) satisﬁes ui > 0 and uii < 0 with respect
to each good i = c,s, and uij > 0. The utility function satisﬁes the standard Inada conditions.






Besides consumption (goods and housing service) decisions, households make portfolio deci-
sions to smooth out income uncertainty. We consider two distinct assets : a riskless ﬁnancial
asset denoted by a0 ∈ A with a net return r, and a risky housing durable good denoted by
h0 ∈ H with a market price p where the prime is used to denote future variables. In addition
to being an investment good, housing provides services according to the linear technology func-
tion s = g(h0)=h0 which is bounded by the size of the investment s ≤ h0. In addition, housing
investment is ﬁnanced through long-term mortgage contracts and is subject to transaction costs.
Household income is stochastic during working years, j<j ∗, and depends on a number of
11factors. Basic wage income is denote by w. In addition, households earnings depend on age.
This factor is denoted as vj and introduces a life-cycle pattern to earnings. The remaining
factor is the idiosyncratic, stochastic factor,   ∈ E which is drawn from a probability space, and
evolves according to the transition law Π , 0. During the retirement years, j ≥ j∗, a household
receives a retirement beneﬁt from the government equal to θ. In addition to labor earnings and
ﬁnancial wealth (1+r)a, households with a positive housing investment can earn rental income
by supplying housing services to the rental market, R(h0 − s) where R denotes the rental price.
To receive rental income households have to pay a ﬁxed cost  >0 to enter this market.
Households are subject to a progressive income tax represented by a function T(ay) where
ay denotes households’ adjusted gross income ay.7 The importance of including a progressive
income code is to understand and account for the interaction between mortgage choice and the
tax code. Clearly, changes in the tax code and limits on deductions are likely to impact the





w υj + ra+ R(h0 − s) − Φ,i f j < j ∗,
θ + ra+ R(h0 − s) − Φ,i f j ≥ j∗.
(3.2)
where q = {p,R,r,rm} represents a price vector and Φ represents deductions to gross income.
Notice that the tax system treats owner-occupied and rental occupied housing asymmetrically
as rental housing services are taxed while the imputed service ﬂow from owner-occupied is not.
The deduction of mortgage payments for owner-occupied housing introduces another asymmetry.





(1 − τp)w υj +( 1+r)a + tr − T(ay),i f j < j ∗,
θ +( 1+r)a + tr − T(ay),i f j ≥ j∗.
(3.3)
where τp represents the social security contributions used to ﬁnance the social security system.
In the presence of mortality risk and missing annuity markets we assume borrowing constraints
a0 ≥ 0, to prevent households from dying with negative wealth. The proceeds from households
that die and have a positive housing investment and/or asset position are redistributed to the
living households as a lump-sum transfer, tr. We also assume that households are born with
initial wealth dependent on their initial income level.8
As we have previously mentioned, housing investment requires long-term ﬁnancing through
mortgage contracts. Since we focus on recursive equilibrium we want to summarize all the rele-
vant information of these long-term mortgage contracts with a ﬁnite number of state variables.
7We assume standard properties of a progressive tax function such as diﬀerentiability T
0(ay) > 0 and T
00(ay) <
0, where T(ay)/ay > 0 represents the average income tax.
8The purpose of this assumption is to account for the fact that some of the youngest household’s who purchase
housing have some wealth. Failure to allow for the initial asset position creates a bias against the purchase of
homes in the earliest age cohorts.
12In a stationary environment, the housing stock, h, the type of mortgage contract, z, and re-
maining length of the mortgage, n, are suﬃcient to recover all the relevant information such as
mortgage payment, remaining liability, and equity in the house.9
Individuals make decisions over consumption goods, housing services, mortgage contract
type, and investment in assets and housing. The household’s current period budget constraint
depends on the household’s asset holdings, the current housing investment, the remaining length
of the mortgage, labor income shock, and households age. We can isolate ﬁve possible optimiza-
tion problems that the household solves. The value function for a household is described by
the state vector which depends the entering asset position, a, the prior period housing position,
h, the number of periods remaining on an existing mortgage, n, mortgage contract type, z,the
value of the current period idiosyncratic shock   and age, j. We will always characterize the
value function by the order of state variables v(a,h,n,z, ,j). We can think of the household
as being in one of ﬁve situations with respect to yesterday’s and today’s housing investment
position.
1. Renter yesterday (h =0 )and renter today (h0 =0 ):Consider a household that does
not own a house at the start of the period, h = n = z =0 , and decides to continue renting
housing services in the current period, h
0
= n0 = z0 =0 . The decision problem in recursive
form can be expressed as:






π( , 0)v(a0,0,0,0,  0,j+1 )
)
, (3.4)
s.t. c + a0 + Rs = y(a,h0,s, ,υ j,j;q),
where Rs denote the cost of housing services purchased in the rental market. Their is
no restriction on the size of housing services rented.10 The restriction in the choice set
indicates that asset markets are incomplete since short-selling is precluded and only an
noncontingent claim on capital is traded.
2. Renter yesterday (h =0 )and homeowner today (h0 > 0) : In this situation, we con-
sider a households that rented the previous period h =0 , and chooses to purchase a house
9It should be pointed out that h, z, and n are suﬃcient information to identify information about a contract
even when mortgage loans have diﬀerent maturities N(z) and interest rates r
m(z). In our recursive notation,
households begin with a mortgage obligation D(N(z),z)=( 1 − χ(z))ph
0 that diminshes every period. The
mortgage payment each period are calculated using m(x,z)=A(n,z)+I(n,z), where the interest payments are
calculated by I(n,z)=r
m(z)D(n,z). The law of motion for the level of housing debt D(n,z) can be written as,
D(n − 1,z)=( 1+r
m(z))D(n,z) − m(x,z).
The law of motion for home equity increases with mortgage payments. That is
H(n − 1,z)=H(n,z)+[ m(x,z) − r
m(z)D(n,z)],
where H(N,z)=χ(z)ph
0 denotes the home equity in the initial period.
10Other housing papers impose some limits in the size of rental-occupied housing. In this paper, renters can
consumer any size of housing services.
13in the current period, h
0
> 0. The housing investment requires a choice of mortgage z0 ∈ Z
to ﬁnance an initial expenditure of (φb + χ(z0))ph0 where φb represents a transaction cost
parameter and χ(z0) denotes the downpayment fraction associated to mortgage z0.11 The
period mortgage payment is m(x,z0) where x =( p,h0,χ(z0),N(z0),rm(z0)) In this model
housing is a consumption and investment good where housing services can be transacted
in the market. To participate in the rental market each period as a landlord, households
have to pay a ﬁxed operating cost,  >0.12 For these households, housing consumption
satisﬁes s<h 0 receiving rental income R(h0 − s).13 Otherwise, the optimal housing con-
sumption is entirely determined by the housing stock s = h0. In order to incorporate this
decision into the choice problem we introduce an indicator variable, Ir, that takes on the
value of unity when the household chooses to be a landlord, and zero otherwise. Formally:











s.t. c + a0 +( φb + χ(z0))ph0 + m(x,z0)+x(h0,s)=y(a,h0,s, ,υ j,j;q)
+ Ir
£




Owning property requires a maintenance expense each period. The total maintenance
cost depends on the choice to supply rental property. If homeowners choose not to supply
housing services to the rental market, (i.e., Ir =0)t h e ns = h0 and the maintenance
expense is given by x(h0,s)=δoph0 where δo represents the depreciation rate of owner-
occupied housing. Alternatively, a households can choose to supply housing services to
the rental market, (i.e., Ir =1 ) . In this case, maintenance expense depends on the amount
of housing supplied to the rental market and their own consumption and is deﬁned as
x(h0,s)=δops + δrp(h0 − s), where δr represents the depreciation rate of rental-housing.
The presence of moral hazard associated with renting property implies that there is an
spread in depreciation rates (4δ = δr − δo > 0) that reduces the implicit cost of owner-
11For computational reasons χ is not a choice variable in the model. The endogenous choice of downpayment
would require keeping track of an additional state for the downpayment choice since this decision is dynamic. A
higher downpayment today reduces both current and future mortgage payments.
12The decision to supply rental property is entwined with the decision to invest in housing. The separation
of housing consumption services and housing investment allows the rental market to be formalize while keeping
the state space relatively tractable. Introducing two diﬀerent housing stocks such as owner-occupied and rental-
occupied would require an additional portfolio choice making the problem computationally infeasible.
As a result, all the landlords are homeowners but the not the other way around. Nevertheless, the American
Housing Survey reports that the fraction of individuals that report to receive rental income and rental the house
they occupied is almost zero.
13This formulation imples that a household that leases property uses a mortgage with a downpayment of
χ percent of the value of the property. Although this may seem to be an unrealistic assumption, the POMS
Survey reports that 81.1 percent of rental property owners used some sort of mortgage ﬁnancing in ﬁnancing the
acquisition of rental property.
14occupied consumption. The choice of rental supply is complex because landlords not only
take into account the maintenance expense, but the tax provisions with respect to rental-
income. For a more detailed analysis of the tax treatment of homeowners and landlords,
see Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2007).
3. Homeowner yesterday (h>0) and renter today (h0 =0 ):In this situation we
consider a household that is selling the property h>0 to become a renter in the current
period h0 =0 . 14 The decision to sell property reveals why housing is a risky investment.
At the moment of sales, the household is subject to an idiosyncratic capital gain or amenity
shock, ξ ∈ Ξ. This shocks impacts the selling value of the property by change the size of
the housing investment.15 This shock is not revealed until the house is sold. We assume
this shock is i.i.d. and discrete. The unconditional probability of the shock is πξ. The
optimization problem for this situation is:


















s.t. cξ + a0
ξ + Rsξ = y(a,h0,s, ,υ j,j;q)+[ ( 1− φs)pξh − D(n,z)],
The optimal choice depends on the income received from selling the property, pξh,n e to f
transactions costs from selling, φs, and remaining principle D(n,z) which depends on the
mortgage balance (n =0if the mortgage is paid oﬀ or n>0 if positive balance remains)
associated to the chosen contract z.16 Notice that the consumption of goods, housing
services, and savings are conditioned on the idiosyncratic shock since net income depends
on the realization of ξ.
4. Homeowner yesterday (h>0) and homeowner today (h0 > 0) : The last cases deal
with a household that enters the period with a housing investment and decides to continue
to have a housing investment position. The critical issue is whether the household decides
to change their housing position.
(a) Homeowner maintains housing size
If the household decides to maintain their housing investment position, h = h0, the
14In the last period, all households must sell h, rent housing services and consume all their assets, a,a sa




15The idiosyncratic capital gain shock introduces a form of risk into the housing investment decision without
having to introduce an aggregate shock. Adding aggregate uncertainty is not compuationally feasible in this
model at this time. This shock can be thought of as what happens to a property if the surrounding neighborhood
deteriorates or improves. This change would be reﬂected in the house value at the time of sale. An additional
advantage of the formulation is that it eliminates the necessity of matching buyers and sellers as any buyer can
always purchase a brand new home with independence of the shock received by the seller.
16Since our analysis will be conducted at the steady state, other than the diﬀerences between buying and selling
transaction costs, there are no diﬀerences in the purchase and selling prices of housing.
15optimization problem can be written as:







π( , 0)v(a0,h 0,n− 1,z,  0,j+1 )
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(3.7)
s.t. c + a0 + m(x,z)+x(h0,s)=y(a,h0,s, ,υ j,j;q)+Ir
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where n0 =m a x {n−1,0}. If n0 > 0,a mortgage payment is required. The decision on
the amount of housing services to consume and thus maintenance expenses depends
on choice of paying a ﬁxed cost   to become a landlord. It should also be pointed out
that this formulation does not allow the household to change mortgage type which is
equivalent to an assumption of no reﬁnancing. Later we will relax this assumption an
examine the reﬁnancing issue. We initially preclude this option so we can get a clear
picture of the implication of diﬀerent mortgage types for the purchase of housing.
(b) Homeowner changes housing size
If the household decides to either up-size or down-size their housing investment posi-





















This constraint accounts for the additional income from selling their home (net of
transaction costs, φspξh, and remaining principle, D(n,z)), the cost of buying a new
home with mortgage product z0, as well as the amenity shock associated with the
sale of the home. Just as in case 3, optimal choices depends on the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock ξ. In this case, savings and household investment depend on the
shock.
3.2. The Financial Intermediary
The ﬁnancial intermediary is a zero proﬁt business. The ﬁrm receives the deposits of the house-
holds, a0 and uses these funds to make loans to ﬁrms and households. Firms take out loans of
capital to produce goods and households require long-term mortgages to ﬁnance the investment
in housing. They receive mortgage payments from homeowners, principal payments from indi-
viduals who sell their home with remaining principle on their mortgage, and principle payments
16from individuals who unexpectedly die. The ﬁnancial intermediary’s balance sheet determines
the equilibrium condition in the asset market.
3.3. The Production Sector
The production sector is relatively standard. Firms produce according to a constant returns
to scale technology Y = f(K,L) where K and L are aggregate inputs of capital and labor,
respectively. We assume that capital depreciates at the rate δ>0 each period. Firms’ output
can be used for consumption, capital investment or housing purposes.
3.4. Government
In this economy, the government engages in a number of activities: ﬁnancing some exogenous
government expenditure, providing retirement beneﬁts through a social security program, and
redistributing the wealth of those individuals who die unexpectedly. We assume that the ﬁnanc-
ing of government expenditures and social security are managed under diﬀerent budgets
In the general budget constraint, revenues are generated from the taxation of adjusted in-
c o m e .W eh a v ep r e v i o u s l yd e ﬁned T(ay) as the tax obligations given certain adjusted income.
We deﬁne t(a,h,n,z, ,j) to be the tax obligations of a representative household based on their
state space. In this situation government revenue is given by
G = T =
Z
μjt(a,h,n, ,j)Φ(da × dh × dn × dz × d  × dj), (3.9)
and thus government expenditure is determined by the amount of revenue collected from the
income taxation.
The government provides social security beneﬁts to retired households. The beneﬁt, θ,i s
b a s e do ns o m ef r a c t i o n ,θ, of the average income of workers. These payments are ﬁnanced by
taxing the wage income of employed households at the rate τp. Since this policy is self-ﬁnancing,





















The ﬁnal role of the government is to collect the physical and housing assets of those indi-
vidual who unexpectedly die. Both of these assets are sold and any outstanding debt on housing
17is paid oﬀ. The remaining value of these assets is distributed to the surviving households as a




where Tris the aggregate (net) value of assets accumulated over the state space from unexpected
death and is deﬁned as17
Tr=
Z





μj(1 − ψj)[(1 − φs)pξh(a,h,n,z, ,j)−
D(a,h,n,z, ,j)]Φ(da × dh × dn × dz × d  ×{ 2,..,J}). (3.11)
3.5. Market Clearing Conditions
This economy has four markets: the asset market, labor market, the rental of housing services
market, and the goods market. All markets are assumed to be competitive.
The market clearing condition in the goods market is given by:
C + K0 − (1 − δ)K + IH + G + Υ = F(K,L) (3.12)
where C,K,G,IH, and Υ represent aggregate consumption, aggregate investment in real capital,
aggregate government spending, aggregate housing investment, and various transaction costs,
respectively. Each of these aggregates are deﬁne more formally in the appendix where the
recursive stationary equilibrium is deﬁned.
In the labor market, the equilibrium wage is determined by the marginal product of labor
w = F2(K,L) (3.13)




  μjvj .
The asset market clearing condition is complicated by the presence of mortgages, unexpected
death, and idiosyncratic capital gain shocks. In order to simply the notation, let Φ(a,h,n,z, ,j)
determines the measure of individuals in a given point in the state space Λ ≡ (a,h,n,z, ,j).In
addition, deﬁne Is(Λ) to be an indicator function that is equal to one when a housing investment
position is sold and zero otherwise. This function will help in identifying when idiosyncratic
capital gain shocks are present. The equilibrium condition in the asset market is:
17The new generation receives a lump sum transfer as we endow these individuals with capital assets observed





































where Φ(dΛ) ≡ Φ(da × dh × dn × dz × d  × dj).
The left hand side of this equation indicates the total amount of capital available to loan
to ﬁrms, while the right hand side measures the sources of this capital. The ﬁr s tl i n eo nt h e
right hand side of the equation captures the savings deposited by households to the ﬁnancial
intermediary. The ﬁrst of these terms measures household deposits if the housing position is
not sold while the second term on this line allows the deposit decision to be impacted by the
idiosyncratic capital gain shock when the housing position is sold. From the total of household
deposits, new mortgage loans must be subtracted. The second line on the right hand side
measures new mortgages, and allows for diﬀerences created by idiosyncratic capital gains shocks.
The third line measures an additional source of loanable funds as mortgage payments received
by the ﬁnancial intermediary. This includes payments received by ﬁrst-time buyers and existing
homeowners who continue to make payments on their mortgage, as well as those homeowners
who sell property and have a new mortgage payment which is aﬀected by the idiosyncratic
capital gain shock. The last line on the right hand side of the equation captures the repayment
of remaining mortgage principle from households who sell their house as well as the repayment
of outstanding debt of households who unexpectedly die with outstanding principle.
In this model, the rental market is endogenous. Individuals who cannot aﬀord to buy a
house must purchase or rent housing services. Rental property is supplied by those individuals
that have a positive housing investment position and pay the ﬁxed cost  >0 to supply rental
property, (i.e., h0 − s>0). Households who supply housing services receive R(h0 − s) gross
rental income. The rental price R adjusts to equate the aggregate demand for housing services
with the aggregate supply of rental services. Before deﬁning the market clearing equation,



















The left hand side of the question measures the supply of housing services while the right hand
19side measures the demand for housing services. On both sides of the equation, home sellers are
diﬀerentiated from non-sellers by recognizing that rental choices for home sellers are contingent
on the realization of the capital gain shock, ξ.
4. Parameterization
We parameterize the model to match some key moments of the U.S. economy. This strat-
egy allows us to specify a limited number of parameter values while estimating the remaining
parameters as an exercise in exactly-identiﬁed Generalized Method of Moments. With the pa-
rameterized model, we will evaluate the impact of diﬀerent mortgage contracts across various
dimensions.
4.1. Demographics
Each period in the model is taken to be three years. Individuals enter the labor force at age 20
(model period 1) and potentially live till age 86 (model period 23). Retirement is assumed to be
mandatory at age 65 (model period 16). Individuals survive to the next period with probability
ψj+1.These probabilities are set at survival rates observed in 1994, and the data are from the
National Center for Health Statistics, United States Life Tables, 1994. The size of the age speciﬁc
cohorts, μj, need to be speciﬁed. Because of our focus on steady state equilibrium, these shares
must be consistent with the stationary population distribution. As a result, these shares are
determined from μj = ψjμj−1/(1 + ρ) for j =2 ,3,...,J and
PJ
j=1 μj =1 , where ρ denotes the
population growth rate. Using the resident population as the measure of the population, the
annual growth rate is set at 1.2 percent.
4.2. Preferences and Technology
The choice of preferences is based on empirical evidence. Jeske (2005) documents that the
housing service/consumption ratio increases by age. He points out that a constant relative risk
aversion momentary utility function that allows the consumption of housing and nonhousing
services as arguments has the implication that the housing service to consumption ratio stays
constant over the life cycle.18 We assume that preferences over the consumption of goods and







The coeﬃcients, σ1, and σ2, determine the curvature of the utility function with respect to
consumption and housing services. The relative ratio of σ1 and σ2 determines the growth
rate of the housing to consumption ratio. A larger curvature in consumption relative to the
18We also ﬁnd that such a momentary utility function generates insuﬃcient movements in housing position as
well as introducing some counterfactional implications for the rental market.
20curvature in housing services implies that the marginal utility of consumption exhibits relatively
faster diminishing returns. When household income increases over the life-cycle (or diﬀerent
idiosyncratic labor income shocks), a larger fraction of resources are allocated to housing services.
We set σ2 =1and σ2 =3to match the observed average growth rate while the preference
parameter γ is estimated.
The choice of technology is relatively standard. We assume that the aggregate production
function is Cobb-Douglas with:
F(K,L)=KαL1−α
The capital share parameter is set to 0.29. This value is calculated by dividing private ﬁxed
assets plus the stock of consumer durables less the stock of residential structures by output plus
the service ﬂows from consumer durables less the service ﬂow from housing.19 Since the ﬁrm’s
output can be used either for consumption, housing investment, or capital good investment, the
relative price of housing, p, is equal to one.
4.3. Endowments
Workers are assumed to have an inelastic labor supply, but the eﬀective quality of their supplied
labor depends on two components. One component is an age-speciﬁc, υj, a n di sd e s i g n e dt o
capture the "hump" in life cycle earnings. We use data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Money,
Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the Unites Stated, 1994," Current Population
Reports, Series P-60 to construct this variable. The other component captures the stochastic
component of earnings and is based on Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004). We discretize
this income process into a ﬁve state Markov chain using the methodology presented in Tauchen
(1986). The values we report reﬂect the three year horizon employed in the model. As a result,
the eﬃciency values associated with each possible productivity value   are
  ∈ E = {4.41,3.51,2.88,2.37,1.89}
and the transition matrix is:
π =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
0.47 0.33 0.14 0.05 0.01
0.29 0.33 0.23 0.11 0.03
0.12 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.12
0.03 0.11 0.23 0.33 0.29
0.01 0.05 0.14 0.33 0.47
⎤




Each household is born with an initial asset position. The purpose of this assumption is
to account for the fact that some of the youngest households who purchase housing have some
wealth. Failure to allow for this initial asset distribution creates a bias against the purchase of
19A data appendix is available that details the calculation of this parameter as well as other parameters used
in the paper.
21homes in the earliest age cohorts. As a result we use the asset distribution observed in Panel
Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) to match the initial distribution of wealth for the cohort
of age 20 to 23. Each income state has assigned the corresponding level of assets to match the
nonhousing wealth to earnings ratio.
4.4. Housing
The housing market introduces a number of parameters. The purchase of a house requires a
mortgage and downpayment. In this paper we focus on the 30 year ﬁxed rate mortgage as the
benchmark mortgage. As a result of the assumption that a period is three years, we set the
mortgage length, N, to ten periods. The downpayment requirement, χ, is set to twenty percent
matching facts from the American Housing Survey. Buying and selling property is subject to
transaction costs. We assume that all these costs are paid by the buyer and set φs =0and
φb =0 .06.
Because of the lumpy nature of housing, the speciﬁcation of the second point in the housing
grid has important ramiﬁcations. This grid point, h, determines the minimum house size, and has
implications for the timing of the purchase of housing investment, wealth portfolio decisions and
homeownership rate. To avoid having the choice of this variable having inadvertent implications
for the results, we determine the size of this grid point as part of the estimation problem.
As previously explained, housing depreciates at rates which depend on whether the property
is owner-occupied or rented. The values for δo and δr are estimated.
We used data from the 1995 American Housing Survey to quantify the i.i.d. capital gains
shock. To calculate the probability distribution for this shock we measure capital gains based on
the purchase price of the property and what the property owner believes to be the current market
value. This ratio is adjusted by the holding length to express the appreciation in annualized
terms. Then we estimate a kernel density and discretize the density in three even partitions.
The average annualized price changes ranging from lowest to highest are -0.19, -0.04, and 0.31
where the expected capital gain is about 2.5 percent. Appropriate adjustments were made for
our model where a period corresponds to a three year period.20
4.5. Government and the Income Tax Function
The government has three functions in the model. Income is provided to retired individuals
through a social security program. The social security budget constraint involves two parameters:
the replacement ratio, θ, and the social security tax rate. We set the replacement ratio to be
thirty percent and solve for the payroll tax rate consistent with the budget constraint. In this
case, the payroll tax is 5.25 percent.
20To test the robustness of the results based on data from the American Housing Survey, we employed a similar
approach using 1995 Tax Roll Data for Duval County in Florida. Jacksonville is the major city in Duval County.
This data follows real estate properties as opposed to individuals. We calculated annualized capital gains based
on actual sales. We found very similar estimates for the capital gains shock using this data source.
22Government spending is ﬁnanced through income taxation. To get an accurate assessment
of housing policy wedges, we want the income tax code to be a good approximation of the actual
U.S. tax code. Gouveia and Strauss (1994) estimated a functional form for the US federal income
tax code that is theoretically motivated by the equal sacriﬁce principle. The actual tax paid by
ah o u s e h o l d ,T(ay), is based on adjusted gross income, and is determined by the functional form
T(ay)=η0(ay − (ay−η1 + η2)
−1
η1 ),
where (η0,η 1,η 2) are policy parameters. The marginal income tax rate is




This functional form is very ﬂexible and allows lump-sum taxes (η1 = −1), proportional (η1 →
0), or progressive taxes (η1 > 0) as special cases. The parameter η0 is a scaling factor that
determines the level of the tax brackets and the marginal tax rate but does not impact the
curvature of the tax function. The parameter η2 depends on units of measurement used to
measure income and determines the size of income deduction. Gouveia and Strauss estimate the
policy parameters and ﬁnd that η0 =0 .258,η 1 =0 .768, and η2 =0 .003710. In the benchmark
economy we use the same parameter estimates used by Gouveia and Strauss for η1 but η2 is set
to 0.3710 to accommodate the model measurement units. The parameter η0 is determined in
the estimation section to pin-down the share of federal revenue in GDP. It is important to note
that in the various experiments we conduct, we hold η1 and η2 constant but allow η0 to change
in each experiment so that the revenue/output ratio remains constant. Following the provisions
of the current income tax code, we allow mortgage interest payments and maintenance expenses
for rental property to be deducted from income that is taxable. In addition, rental income is
taxable, but the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing is not.
4.6. Estimation
We estimate seven parameters using an exactly-identiﬁed Method of Moments approach. The
parameters that need to be estimated are the depreciation rate of the capital stock, δ, the
depreciation rate for rental units, δr, the depreciation rate for ownership units, δo, the relative
importance of consumption goods to housing services, γ, the discount rate, β, the size of the
smallest housing investment position, and the tax function parameter, η0. We identify these
parameter values so that the resulting aggregate statistics in the model economy are equal to
seven targets observed in the U.S. economy.
1. Wealth to gross domestic product ratio (K/Y ):We ﬁnd the target is the ratio of
capital to gross domestic product (GDP) which is about 2.541, (annualized value) for the
period 1958-2001 where we deﬁne the capital stock as private ﬁxed assets plus the stock
of consumer durables less the stock of residential structures so as to be consistent with
capital in the model. We measure GDP to be consistent with output in the model. That
23is, output is measured as reported GDP plus service ﬂo w sf r o mc o n s u m e rd u r a b l e sl e s st h e
service ﬂow from housing.21
2. Housing stock to Fixed capital stock ratio (H/K):In this ratio the housing capital
stock is deﬁned as the value of ﬁxed assets in owner and tenant residential property. The
housing stock data is from the ﬁxed asset tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We
ﬁnd the ratio of the housing stock to nonhousing capital stock to be 0.43.
3. Housing Investment to Housing Stock ratio (xH/H):The ratio of the investment
in residential structures to housing capital stock is targeted at 0.04.
4. Housing services to consumption of goods ratio (Rsc/c):The targeted housing con-
sumption to nonhousing consumption is also based on NIPA data where housing services
are deﬁned as personal consumption expenditure for housing and nonhousing consumption
is deﬁned as nondurable and services consumption expenditures net of housing expendi-
tures. The targeted ratio for 1994 is 0.23, but the number does not vary greatly over the
period 1990-2000. This value is from Jeske(2005).
5. Fixed capital investment to GDP ratio (δK/Y):The ﬁfth target is the investment
in capital goods to output ratio which is 0.135.
6. Homeownership Ratio: This target is based on data from the American Housing Survey
for 1994 and is equal to 64.0 percent.
7. Government expenditure to output ratio (T(ay)/Y):The ﬁnal target using NIPA
data is the government expenditure-output ratio. We deﬁne government expenditure as
federal government expenditures. The parameter η0 is endogenously determined when
solving the model to target the 7.4 percent ratio of federal government expenditure-GDP
observed in 1994.22
Table 1 summarizes the parameter estimates and the empirical targets. The moments and
the parameter values are presented in annual terms.
21We estimated service ﬂows using procedures outlines in Cooley and Prescott (1995).
22The Gouveia and Strauss tax function was estimated for the period 1979-1989. As our model is calibrated
for the period 1994-1996, we acknowledge some inconsistency. However, since our focus is on the importance of
various margins impacted by housing policy, we do not feel this inconsistency is a major problem.
24Table 1: Method of Moments Estimates (values in annual terms)
Statistic Parameter Moment Model % Error
1 )R a t i oo fw e a l t ht og r o s sd o m e s t i cp r o d u c t β =0 .976 2.541 2.5446 0.143
2) Ratio of housing stock to Fixed capital stock δo =0 .034 0.430 0.4266 -0.792
3) Housing Investment to Housing Stock ratio δr =0 .075 0.040 0.0403 -0.388
4) Ratio housing services to consumption of goods γ =0 .954 0.230 0.2291 -0.411
5) Ratio ﬁxed capital investment to GDP δk =0 .043 0.135 0.1353 0.339
6) Homeownership Rate h =1 .473 0.640 0.6370 -0.468
7) Government expenditure to output ratio η0 =0 .197 0.074 0.0742 -0.005
The implied targets generated by the model solution are within one percent error for all
the observed targets. The estimation of the structural parameters is not separated from the
computation of equilibrium (household’s optimization problem and market clearing). That in-
cludes three additional nonlinear equations (asset market, government budget constraint, and
accidental bequest) to include in the distance minimization routine that have be satisﬁed in
conjunction with the moments observed in the data.
4.7. Model Evaluation
The baseline economy is estimated to match certain key features of the US economy in 1994.
Since we want to use the model to evaluate mortgage contract choice, it is important to brieﬂy
evaluate the performance of the model. In this section, we examine whether the model generates
reasonable patterns of participation in the owner-occupied market, housing consumption, and
ﬁnancial portfolio decisions. A starting point is to inquire whether the model generates a reason-
able homeownership rate. Since the aggregate homeownership rate is a target in the estimation
problem, we can check to see if the model generates a reasonable amount of “ﬁrst-time buyers”
which we deﬁne as households owning a home and being under the age of 35. Data indicates
that 37.3 percent of households in this age cohort are homeowners. The model generates a
participation rate of 37.6 percent. In Table 2, we present the homeownership rate across the
age and income distributions. As can be seen, the observed homeownership rate has a hump
shaped behavior with the highest rate occurring in the 65-74 age cohort. The model generates a
very similar pattern. It should be pointed out that the under prediction of the oldest cohort is
a result of the assumption that households must rent in the ﬁnal period. Data indicates a rising
homeownership rate in income, and the model generates a similar proﬁle. However, the proﬁle
generated by the model is steeper.
25Table 2: Homeownership Rates by Age and Income
Variable Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 64.0 40.0 64.5 75.2 79.3 77.4
Baseline Model 1994 63.7 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
b y I n c o m e Q u i n t i l e s Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5
Data 1994 46.6 56.1 64.4 75.5 89.1
Baseline Model 1994 32.0 83.9 98.4 100.0 100.0
Data source: Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS) and American Housing Survey (AHS)
Another dimension of interest is the consumption of housing services. We measure average
consumption of housing services by computing the average size of an owner-occupied house.
Data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) ﬁnds the average owner-occupied house is
2,137 square feet. Our model implies an average house size of 2,348 square feet. In Table 3,
we report observed housing size by age cohorts. Housing size increases until age 65 when some
downsizing begins to appear. The model captures the magnitude and the hump-shaped behavior
by age groups. However, some over-prediction of house size is observed.
Table 3 : Owner-occupied Housing Consumption
Simulation Sqft. Owners1
by Age Cohorts
Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 2,137 1,854 2,220 2,301 2,088 2,045
Baseline Model 1994 2,348 2,147 2,297 2,429 2,514 2,362
Data source: American Housing Survey (AHS)
Since households make savings decisions with respect to assets, the portfolio allocations im-
plied by the model can be analyzed. In the model, a households ﬁnancial portfolio is comprised
of asset holding and equity in housing investment. We use data from the 1994 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances to determine the importance of housing in household portfolios. We deﬁne
assets as bond and stock holdings and housing is deﬁned as the respondent’s estimated value
26of their house adjusted for the remaining principle.23 The data indicates housing makes up a
large fraction of a household’s portfolio in the youngest age cohorts. This fraction declines as
the household ages until around the retirement age, and then increases as households consume
their non-housing wealth after retirement. As can be seen in Figure 1, the model generates a
very similar pattern.
Figure 1: Housing in the Portfolio by Age


















Data source: Survey Consumer Finance (SCF)
5. The Mortgage Decision
Until the mid-nineties the set of mortgage products available was relatively limited. The vast
majority of homeowners purchased their residency using a standard 30 year ﬁxed rate loan with
a 20 percent downpayment. Over the last decade, as a result of deregulation and innovations
in the mortgage industry, private markets have introduced loan products that diﬀer from more
traditional mortgage instruments. Each contract type has potentially diﬀerent dynamic implica-
tions resulting in the need to fully understand the impact of housing ﬁnance for the productive
economy.
We begin by examining mortgage decisions in an environment where homeowners have the
choice of ﬁnancing a house with a 30 year ﬁxed rate contract or one of the other contract types
discussed. An analysis with two contracts has the advantage of allowing the eﬀects of an addi-
tional mortgage contract to be more transparent. To make all the experiments comparable, we
23W ea c k n o w l e d g es o m ei n c o n s i s t e n c yi nt h ed a t aa n dt h em o d e l .T h ev a l u eo fh o u s i n gt h eS C Fi n c l u d e sb o t h
the value of the structure and the value of land. Land is not accounted for in the model. Hence, the value of
housing in the model reﬂect soley the value of the structure.
27maintain the baseline calibration including the parameters of tax code. This means we allow gov-
ernment revenue to adjust as contract types change.24 In this paper, we study the implications
of mortgage decisions for aggregate and distributional housing market eﬀects, buying and selling
patterns, and consumption smoothing. We ﬁnalize the section by exploring the implications of
downpayment choice.
5.1. Mortgage Contract Choice and Type of Contract
We consider eight diﬀerent experiments of mortgage choice. We consider four graduated payment
mortgage contracts that diﬀer in the nature and the growth rate of the repayment schedule, but
the common feature is that loan payments increase over the length of the mortgage. A contract
labeled ‘low’ or ‘high’ will denote the steepness of the increase in mortgage payments. A GPM
contract with an arithmetic structure and noted as ’low’ has a step size of .01 while the ’high’
case has a step size of .05. If a GPM contract has a geometric structure, we specify growth rate
in the ’low’ case to be .05, and in the ’high’ case .15.
An alternative loan that allows for changing payments over time are balloons or interest
only loans. The balloon contracts that we consider are actually a combination of a pure balloon
contract for an initial period that rolls into a standard ﬁxed rate mortgage for the remaining
years. We consider two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of this loan product. The ﬁrst contract considers
a twelve year (four periods) interest only loan with a twenty downpayment requirement that is
rolled into a eighteen year (six periods) FRM contract. The second contract has been motivated
by recent events in the subprime crises and modiﬁes the previous loan by allowing a zero down-
payment and including the transaction costs associated with the main loan. We also examine
a combo or Piggyback mortgage which employs a secondary loan for the downpayment. The
main diﬀerence of the combo loan contract from the prior contracts is that individuals trade-oﬀ
a lower downpayment at the expense of higher initial mortgage payments as the household bor-
rows the full amount of the downpayment. In general, the repayment structure of combo loan
contracts declines over the length of the mortgage since the second loan has a shorter maturity
than the main loan. Despite the high initial payments, this loan product allows households
that are downpayment constrained but can aﬀord the mortgage payments to purchase a house.
However, combo loan contracts allow for a very slow accumulation of equity. An alternative
contract with a decreasing repayment schedule that allows households to accrue equity very fast
is the constant amortization loan. In Table 4 we present the aggregate implications of mortgage
decisions.
24Because of the focus of the paper, we abstracted from the second order eﬀects associated with maintaining
the level of government revenue. This also means that a welfare analysis would embed some inconsistencies.
28Table 4: Aggregate Eﬀects of Mortgage Choice
Number of Properties Share Homeowners with
Ownership Housing Size No With FRM Second
Simulation Rate Owners Var. Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage
Data (AHS 1994) 64.0 2,137 969 39.3 60.7 - -
Baseline with FRM 63.7 2,348 816 30.1 69.9 100.0 0.0
GPM-Arithmetic (Low) 64.1 2,412 832 29.8 70.2 69.7 30.3
GPM-Arithmetic (High) 68.3 2,299 1,003 1.7 98.3 45.4 54.6
GPM-Geometric (Low) 64.5 2,450 884 28.8 71.2 68.7 31.3
GPM-Geometric (High) 68.7 2,477 1,188 7.1 92.9 46.6 53.4
Balloon Fixed (χ =0 .20) 65.7 2,467 891 26.7 73.3 65.3 34.7
Balloon Fixed (χ =0 .00) 68.6 2,489 1,270 0.2 99.8 49.9 50.1
Combo 80-20 (χ =0 .00) 68.5 2,413 817 19.2 80.8 67.2 32.8
Const.Amortization 65.5 2,471 896 26.8 73.2 33.9 67.1
The ﬁrst two columns focus on the aggregate homeownership rate and the ownership rate
for households between age 20 and 34. The next two columns examine the impact of mortgage
type for housing size. We would like to know whether certain contracts results in larger homes.
The last set of columns focus on issues with respect to contract holding patterns.
The model predicts that the introduction of mortgage decisions has a positive eﬀect on
ownership and housing consumption but the magnitude depends on the characteristics of the
second contract. Two dimensions of mortgage loans that appear to be critical are the proﬁle of
repayment schedule and the downpayment requirement. When downpayment requirements are
high, individuals beneﬁt from using mortgage loans with a steep, increasing repayment proﬁle
since the initial cost of participating in the owner-occupied market is reduced. The increase
in the aggregate homeownership rate depends on the rate of payment growth. The faster the
rate of increase, the lower the initial mortgage payment, but the higher the future payment
obligation. The key is whether these obligations increase faster or slower than earnings. These
eﬀects are illustrated in the various GPM (arithmetic and geometric) and the Balloon Fixed
contracts. Given the model speciﬁcation, the parameterization of the step in the arithmetic loan
implies a steeper repayment proﬁle initially than in the geometric case. Not surprisingly, when
the repayment schedule is ﬂatter the addition of the second mortgage loan has a smaller impact
on ownership when compared to the baseline economy. For example, in the GPM contract with
an arithmetic structure with a low step increase, the ownership rate increases from 63.7 percent
in the baseline economy to 64.1 percent. When the proﬁle is steeper as in the high case, the
participation rate increases to 68.3 percent. A similar pattern occurs with diﬀerent growth in
the geometric version of the GPM contract. The ﬂatter repayment schedule generates increases
in the average size of an owner-occupied house with roughly one third of homeowners choose
this type of contract. The Balloon-FRM with a 20 percent downpayment has very similar eﬀects
on homeownership. Since the initial payments are constant for a longer horizon the impact in
participation are slightly larger. The average size house is slightly larger with this contract.
An alternative to loans with increasing repayment schedules and higher downpayment re-
29quirements are loans with decreasing repayments and no downpayment. The model suggests
that the introduction of the combo loan choice with no downpayment has a similar eﬀect on
ownership as the in the GPM contracts denoted as ’high’. The aggregate ownership in the combo
case is 68.3 and in the 68.5-68.7 percent range depending on the slope of the GPM contract.
One diﬀerence between the combo contract and the increasing payments contract appears in
holding patterns. The steep repayment schedule becomes very attractive for homeowners since
55 percent hold this contract, whereas in the combo loan case only 33 percent will pick this
product. The rationale for the result has to be the higher initial payments in the combo loan.
All the individuals that can aﬀord to accumulate the downpayment prefer a lower loan-to-value
ratio. We will discuss this issue in more detail in the next subsection.
One contract that combines the two features of increasing repayment schedule and no down-
payment is the contract denoted as the balloon contract with no downpayment that rolls into a
standard ﬁxed rate contract.25 The combination of these two features result in a high ownership
rate (68.6 percent). Homeowners also purchase larger homes as the average size house increases
to 2,489 square feet. This loan product is more attractive than the combo loan because the low
initial payments as opposed to high, but not as attractive as the GPM-(High) that has even
lower initial payments.
All the discussed contracts have the unattractive feature that the amortization of the prin-
cipal is very slow. The analysis of the constant amortization contract illustrates what happens
when the repayment schedule declines over time and the amortization is very fast. The model
suggests that the aggregate impact in participation is small (65.5 percent) when compared with
the other contracts. However, two thirds of the homeowners choose this product. This result
is very interesting. In the presence of uninsurable labor income risk, mortgage contracts that
accrued equity earlier allow some homeowners to reduce the utility cost of meeting the mortgage
payments every period. This precautionary motive manifests as an implicit preference to have
equity in the property. When we study the choice of downpayment we will ﬁnd similar results,
but we purposely delay the discussion to the next section. The model suggests that since the
average share of mortgage payments rapidly declines over the life-cycle homeowners choose to
purchase large units with this type of contract.
The introduction of mortgage decisions with nontraditional loan products reveals some inter-
esting patterns in the number of properties that are owned free and clear of mortgage obligations.
With steep repayment schedules or no downpayment the fraction of housing units without mort-
gages declines. The drop is mainly accounted by the eﬀects in the patterns of buying and selling
25It is interesting to point out that two contracts that have played an important role for the increase in the
homeownership rate in the U. S. during the period 2000-2006 are mortgage contracts that have a step function in
the payment structure. These are the 80-20 contracts and the ’2-28’ and ’3-27’ contracts in the subprime market.
The 80-20 product essentially uses a second mortgage to ﬁnance the downpayment thus avoiding mortgage interest
rate costs. We examined this contract and ﬁnd the homeownership rate increases in the aggregate and youngest
age cohorts to 65.5 and 46.1 percent, respectively. A 3-27 contract involves a three year balloon contract that
r o l l si n t oaﬁxed rate contract or a ﬂoating rate contract for the remaining 30 years. We introduced this type
of contract choice into our model and ﬁnd the aggregate homeownership rate increases to 70.8 percent. More
startling, the homeownership rate for the youngest cohort increases to 68.0 percent.
30that we will discuss in the next section. This ﬁnding seems to be consistent with the empirical
evidence reported by the American Housing Survey suggesting that in 1993 roughly 40 percent
of the housing units had no mortgage whereas in 2005 this ﬁgure had declined to 33 percent.
The experiments suggests that mortgage innovation combined with the observed increase in
reﬁnancing could account for this observation.
In order to highlight the importance of introducing mortgage choice into the household
problem, a single choice environment should be considered. If the model is analyzed where
the standard ﬁxed rate contract is replaced with one of the alternative contracts, we ﬁnd very
diﬀerent results. For example, the model predicts that in a single contract economy the constant
amortization mortgage would generate the highest participation rate. In contrast, a GPM with
a low geometric growth rate will generate the lowest aggregate rate. A balloon contract that
is rolled into a standard mortgage contract would especially hurt younger households. The
constant amortization mortgage is the only contract that increases the homeownership for young
households and the economy as a whole. These changes are a result of interest rate, payment
pattern and downpayment changes that force all households to choose a speciﬁc product. With
mortgage choice, households choose the contract that is optimal for their state.
5.1.1. Distributional Housing Market Implications
To fully understand mortgage decisions it is important to analyze its determinants at the individ-
ual level. In particular, we focus on mortgage holdings and participation rates across household’s
age and income. The distributional implications based on these characteristics are summarized
in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5: Age Cohort Eﬀects of Mortgage Type
Contract Type1 Home Ownership Rate % Holding FRM
20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Baseline(FRM) 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5 100 100 100 100 100
FRM-GPM(Ar,L) 38.0 76.7 87.5 91.5 65.7 43.2 74.4 83.3 80.7 98.1
FRM-GPM(Ar,H) 54.9 78.1 77.4 82.8 73.3 44.0 47.8 45.4 40.8 52.2
FRM-GPM(Geo-L) 38.6 77.4 87.2 91.7 65.6 42.8 73.9 81.8 78.5 90.7
FRM-GPM(Geo-H) 47.6 81.9 86.3 88.5 71.2 34.4 52.5 51.0 44.7 55.5
FRM-Balloon(χ = .20) 39.3 81.0 87.8 92.4 65.7 32.1 72.3 82.3 80.0 90.0
FRM-Balloon(χ = .00) 58.2 76.2 74.2 85.7 68.0 46.4 49.3 52.5 47.1 62.6
FRM-Combo(χ = .00) 46.7 82.9 85.6 91.0 66.3 55.7 73.5 76.3 57.6 64.2
FRM-CAM 38.6 79.6 88.7 93.6 67.1 58.3 28.3 18.1 30.9 21.5
Consistent with the logic of the previous section, the model reveals that a contract with
either a steep repayment schedule or no downpayment has a quantitatively signiﬁcant impact on
the participation rate of young cohorts in the owner-occupied market. In the case of the GPM’s
(High) the eﬀects are particularly large since the initial mortgage payments are low, whereas in
the case of the combo loan the eﬀects are a bit smaller. This is a consequence of the relatively
high initial payments. As one could expect, the combination of lower downpayment requirements
and a steep repayment schedule has the largest impact. The importance of the second contract
31is clear when we explore the percent holdings in each contract. Between 55 to 68 percent of
the young cohorts prefers the second contract to the conventional 30-year ﬁxed rate mortgage
with 20 percent downpayment. In general, the majority of these individuals transition into a
FRM contract as they get older, accumulate wealth, and purchase another home. The option
of varying the mortgage choice over the life-cycle increases the participation rate of households
across the age distribution when compared to the baseline economy. For instance, the GPM
with an arithmetic structure and smaller step increase is chosen by 56.8 percent of households
under age, but only by 25.6 percent of households in the 35 to 49 age cohort. When the step is
increased, a possible unattractive feature of this contract appears. The ownership rate for the
youngest households increases to 54.9 percent with 60.3 percent of these households choosing
this contract. However, the large increase in payments causes the homeownership rate to fall
in the 50-64 and 65-74 age cohorts. In addition, with the rapidly increasing payment structure,
households are not transitioning into FRM contracts, since they are exiting the housing market.
The geometrically increasing contracts are favored by the youngest cohort. The age cohort
homeownership rate with this type of increasing payment structure is similar to those found
when a FRM mortgage is the only option. Other contracts such as the constant amortization
product exhibit an increasing popularity over the life-cycle, specially for those households that
have the resources and choose this instrument to increase their equity position in the house.
T h o s et h a td on o th a v et h er e s o u r c e so p tf o rt h es t a n d a r dﬁxed rate mortgage since it oﬀers
relatively lower initial repayments when compared to the constant amortization.
In terms of age the model suggests a certain separation of mortgage choice. Those individuals
that are more likely to receive negative income shocks but still can aﬀord to buy a house either
choose the loan with the lowest initial repayment schedule or lower downpayment. On the
contrary, those that expect to receive positive income shocks tend to choose contracts that
increase their equity in the house. Part of this result is due to the fact that income tends to
increase over the life-cycle, even for individuals that receive negative shocks. The results are
clear when we explore mortgage choice by income quintals.
Table 6: Income Distribution Eﬀects of Mortgage Type
Contract Type1 Home Ownership Rate % Holding FRM
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Baseline(FRM) 32.0 83.9 98.4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FRM-GPM(Ar,L) 53.4 92.3 96.6 100 100 68.2 93.7 46.5 100 100
FRM-GPM(Ar,H) 59.6 80.4 99.4 100 100 45.5 31.5 80.1 100 100
FRM-GPM(Geo-L) 53.7 92.6 96.7 100 100 67.3 91.3 41.7 100 100
FRM-GPM(Geo-H) 59.0 87.6 97.5 100 100 46.5 35.9 70.8 97.8 100
FRM-Balloon(χ = .20) 55.1 92.3 97.5 100 100 64.1 84.9 48.9 100 100
FRM-Balloon(χ = .00) 60.6 71.2 83.4 99.0 100 49.2 31.9 51.1 90.0 100
FRM-Combo(χ = .00) 59.9 86.0 96.5 100 100 67.5 58.8 69.0 99.9 100
FRM-CAM 54.6 93.9 97.5 100 100 33.4 20.7 61.2 14.7 0.0
There are three important results that summarize the ﬁnding in Table 6. First, the intro-
duction of a second contract with either lower initial payments, a higher loan-to-value ratio, or a
combination of both has a positive impact in the participation rate of the lowest income quintal.
32Second, the majority of individuals in the two highest income quintals prefer the traditional
mortgage contract, or contracts that maximize the equity in the house like in the case of the
constant amortization. Third, the decline in participation for the second income quintal relative
to the baseline economy in some of the GPM and the Balloon-Fixed with no downpayment can
be explained by the increase in payments. Some lower income households are attracted to this
products because of the low initial mortgage cost; however, those that receive negative income
shocks and cannot meet the payments are forced to exit the market. As a result, the ownership
rate falls in the subsequent periods. This drop is consistent with the patterns of ownership by
age for the same mortgage contracts. The popularity of these contracts in the third income
quintile can be rationalized by individuals that enter in the owner-occupied market after either
downsizing or renting for one period. Despite the large magnitude of holdings, the total number
of individuals in the third, fourth, and ﬁfth income quintals is very small. These interesting
results reveal that some of these nontraditional products can be successful in the short-run to
increase the participation rate of young and poor households, but generate some visible swings in
the participation rate by age and income. Fortunately, as the eﬀects of idiosyncratic uncertainty
mitigate over the life-cycle (the fraction of borrowing constrained households falls after age 40),
these individuals can use the same contracts to re-enter the owner-occupied market. This is
why the aggregate ownership does not fall. This ﬁndings suggests that nontraditional contracts
introduce very interesting dynamics in the patterns of buying and selling.
5.1.2. Buying and Selling Implications
This subsection explores the implications of mortgage decisions for housing transactions. Table
7 reports some summary measures of housing transactions. In an environment of no mortgage
choice, mobility is limited in our model. We ﬁnd that only 1.7 percent of homeowners move and
those who move, do so for the purposes of upsizing their house. When households are allowed to
have mortgage choice, we ﬁnd an increase in transaction activity. The degree of the transaction
activity increase depends on the type of mortgage contract. This transaction activity appears
as an increase in households moving to either larger or smaller homes, and is presented in Table
7.
Table 7: Summary Measures for Housing Transactions
Homeowners Entry, Exit, and Stay
Contract Type1 Move % Upsize % Downsize Rent to Own Own to Rent Rent to Rent
Baseline(FRM) 1.7 97.0 3.0 6.0 1.5 34.8
FRM-GPM (Ar,L) 2.2 95.3 4.7 6.0 1.6 34.3
FRM-GPM (Ar,H) 12.1 46.1 53.9 23.6 19.1 12.6
FRM-GPM (Geo-L) 2.8 89.6 10.4 6.2 1.8 33.8
FRM-GPM (Geo-H) 14.0 55.2 44.8 14.6 10.1 21.1
FRM-Balloon (χ = .20) 3.5 84.6 15.3 6.4 1.9 32.2
FRM-Balloon (χ = .00) 17.8 30.9 69.1 25.5 21.0 10.3
FRM-Combo (χ = .00) 8.7 64.0 36.0 11.0 6.4 25.1
FRM-CAM 3.8 82.1 17.9 6.5 2.0 32.5
33The table presents statistics on the fraction of homeowners who choose to change their
housing status, as wells as statistics that measure entry and exit decisions. We ﬁnd two insights
from the results. First, the introduction of nontraditional loans - those with low initial payments,
low downpayments, or both - have an important impact on mobility. Two contracts, the GPM-
Arithmetic (High) and the Balloon-Fixed with zero downpayment, particularly stand out and
the combo loan product to a lesser extent. With these contracts, the fraction of homeowners who
move is much greater than with the other contracts. In addition, with more ﬂexible contracts
the probability of downsizing appears much larger. This suggests that some households purchase
large housing units given the relatively low initial ﬁnancing costs. Those individuals that cannot
aﬀord the increase in mortgage obligations are force to downsize or sell. That leads to the second
important ﬁnding. In the baseline model there is a relation of around 4 to 1 between renters
that move into ownership and homeowners that have to sell the house and rent. With the
introduction of these low ﬁnancing products this relation becomes almost 1 to 1. For example,
in the Balloon-Fixed contract with zero downpayment, 25.5 percent of the individuals transit
from rent to own, and 21 percent transit from own to rent. In the baseline economy these
number are 6 and 1.5 percent, respectively. In addition, the number of individuals that remain
contiguous renters decreases with nontraditional contracts.
These results are consistent with the observation that the second contract attracts young and
poor individuals to participate in the owner-occupied market. One way to illustrate this feature
is to present the measures of housing transactions by age. In Figure 2, we present the mobility
patterns for GPM contracts with both an arithmetic and geometric payment structure. For each
contract, the left two graphs represent household movements from renting into ownership and
from ownership to renting. The right size reports upsizing and downsizing activity. Two facts
stand out with respect to a GPM contract with an arithmetic payment structure. First, entry
into the homeownership state occurs much earlier and in a larger magnitude with this type of
GPM contract as compared to the baseline economy. Second, many households that cannot
aﬀord the rising mortgage payments become renters a few periods after buying.
34Figure 2: Mobility Patterns with GPM
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The distribution of owner into the rental position in the Arithmetic (High) shows that on
average 25 to 30 percent of the homeowners cannot aﬀord the increase of mortgage payments
after 9 years. The interesting feature is the decline in this pattern over the life-cycle; this occurs
because most young individuals have very little equity in the house and they opt to sell. As
income rises and homeowners accrue equity in the house and this fraction diminishes. The
movements in and out of the housing market are very diﬀerent when the slope of the repayment
schedule is very ﬂat. Despite the change in the scale in the vertical axis, we observe that the
distributional patterns in Arithmetic (Low) are very similar to the baseline economy. With a
relatively ﬂat repayment schedule most homeowners can aﬀord to meet the increasing payments
over the length of the mortgage and the fraction of individuals forced to sell is substantially
reduced.
To complete the analysis, Figure 3 presents the mobility patterns for the Balloon-Fixed
contract with no downpayment. We observe a signiﬁcant increase in entry into the housing
market followed by a movement out of the market. However, the distribution of individuals that
move from ownership to rental is humped-shaped as opposed to declining as in the previous
example. This feature is a result of the timing of increase in mortgage payments that increase
after 9 years as opposed to every period. After this period, mortgage payments increase from
being interest-only to include 100 percent of the house value and the full amount of the closing
costs. The movement out of the housing market that appear with this contract is of interest as
this contract has similar features to some of the subprime mortgages contracts. In our model,
households sell their home to get out of their mortgage contract rather than foreclose. In reality,
some of these sales may turn out to be foreclosures.
35Figure 3: Mobility Patterns with Balloon-FRM with No Downpayment










































































5.1.3. Risk Sharing and Aggregate Implications
In economies with incomplete markets and long-term mortgage loans, the introduction of new
contracts has some interesting eﬀects on risk sharing that diﬀer from the standard durable
good model with a one-period ahead collateralized loan.26 In the standard model individuals
can mitigate labor income risk by changing the house size so consumption can be smoothed.
This is possible because the ﬁnancial obligations do not have long term eﬀects. In models
with long-term contracts the decision to purchase a house imposes the obligation to pay the
mortgage loan at every period. Consequently, the house payment reduces disposable income
and, in the presence of negative income shocks, individuals lose part of the ability to smooth
consumption.27 The introduction of mortgage decisions allows households to choose the housing
ﬁnance that maximizes their expected discounted utility. For some wealthy individuals with
26We have in mind a model where there are no transaction costs and housing wealth ph
0 and ﬁnancial wealth
(1 + r)a





and where the period budget contraint is deﬁned by
c + ph
0 + a
0 = w + x.
and the mortgage constraint is
a
0 ≥− (1 − χ)ph
0.
27In our model ownership provides an alternative mechanism to smooth consumption. Homeowners can pay a
ﬁxed cost and supply rental property in the market. They can use the additional rental income to cover the cost
of mortgage payments. However, this mechanism is costly.
36positive income shocks, this implies contracts that maximize the equity in the house. For low
income or young individuals the optimal choice is a contract with increasing payment over the
length of the mortgage or high loan-to-value ratios. The result should be a reduction in the
variance of consumption for homeowners, but not necessarily in the variance of housing since
some of these mortgage loans force some individuals in and out of the housing market.
We can study these eﬀects by computing the coeﬃcient of variation of consumption and
housing services for the various mortgage contracts. We also explore the aggregate impact of
mortgage decisions by computing the percent change in aggregate output and consumption with
respect to the baseline economy. From Table 8 we see that the benchmark economy generates a
coeﬃcient of variation of consumption that is0 . 1 1 3w i t hr e n t e r sh a v i n gal a r g e rc o e ﬃcient than
homeowners. Our measure of variance indicates that the consumption of housing services is 0.487
with renters once again having a larger variance as compared to owners. By themselves these
numbers do not have much meaning since they depend on the measurement unit, but the relative
numbers indicate whether new contracts allow households to better smooth consumption.
Table 8: Eﬀects of Mortgage Choice on Risk Sharing
Coeﬃcient of Variation
Percent Change Aggregate1 Consumption Housing
Simulation Consumption Output Total Owner Renters Total Owner Renters
Baseline with FRM - - 0.113 0.088 0.293 0.487 0.291 3.130
GPM-Arithmetic (Low) -0.3% -0.2% 0.115 0.091 0.285 0.507 0.305 3.149
GPM-Arithmetic (High) 2.2% 3.3% 0.098 0.077 0.162 0.474 0.271 1.421
GPM-Geometric (Low) -0.4% 0.1% 0.112 0.087 0.292 0.504 0.302 3.217
GPM-Geometric (High) 0.21% 2.1% 0.102 0.076 0.228 0.395 0.200 2.318
FRM-Balloon(χ = .20) -0.3% 0.5% 0.116 0.086 0.357 0.515 0.303 3.978
FRM-Balloon(χ = .00) 4.7% 5.2% 0.094 0.079 0.143 0.478 0.313 1.040
FRM-Combo(χ = .00) 0.1% 1.0% 0.112 0.085 0.276 0.396 0.206 3.114
FRM-CON 0.1% 0.1% 0.111 0.084 0.336 0.482 0.290 3.578
1Measures percentage change with respect baseline economy
In general, we ﬁnd that the introduction of mortgage choice reduces the coeﬃcient of vari-
ation of consumption for homeowners. The reduction is especially important for contracts that
allow for a steep proﬁle of repayment and/or a low downpayment. The reduction in the vari-
ability of consumption for renters is an artifact of the general equilibrium eﬀects that reduce
the equilibrium price of rental-occupied housing. Interestingly enough, the model predicts that
the contracts that allow for a larger number of transactions in the housing market, also result in
smoother consumption of housing services. The sizeable entry and exit decisions observed in the
Artithmetic (High) and the Balloon-Fixed contract with no downpayment allow households to
reassess the optimal house size, thus reduce consumption of housing services. The introduction
of mortgage decisions is far from neutral. The aggregate impact on production depends on the
speciﬁcs of mortgage contracts. Inspection of Table 9 suggests that the contracts that have a
large impact in the aggregate ownership rate have the largest impact in economic activity. Most
of this increase can be traced by the increase in the stock of housing (not in the table). For
example, with the Arithmetic (High) the stock of housing increases around 6 percent- a value
37this is similar in magnitude to the housing stock when a combo loan is available and twice the
size with a constant amortization contract. However, the increase in aggregate activity does not
necessarily generate an increase in aggregate consumption. This only occurs in the simulations
where the increase in aggregate output is suﬃciently high. Since the model speciﬁcation assumes
that consumption and housing services are imperfect substitutes, the introduction of mortgage
choice allows households to buy larger homes (see Table 4) at the expense of consumption. When
the income eﬀects are suﬃciently large, we observe an increase in the consumption of goods and
housing services.
5.2. Downpayment Decisions
As we have seen in the previous section, downpayments are a critical element of mortgage choice
since it determines the initial level of equity in the property and the level of the repayment
schedule. The empirical evidence reported in Table 9 suggests that there is a large heterogeneity
in downpayment choices.
Table 9: Downpayment Choice by Loan Originator
1995 2001 2003
Loan Originator FHA Others FHA Others FHA Others
First-time buyer 21.6 29.8 18.1 24.5 16.3 24.1
Repeat buyer 22.0 33.3 22.4 29.1 26.5 28.5
Total 23.2 33.5 19.9 27.4 22.6 27.0
Source: American Housing Survey (AHS)
For example the downpayment choice of individuals that choose government subsidized loans
(FHA) choose lower downpayments when compared to non-FHA loans. The downpayment choice
for repeated buyers appears to be larger than for ﬁrst-time buyers. The purpose of this table is
to illustrate the large diﬀerences in choices, and not to account for the decline in downpayments
that is partially due to the introduction of private mortgage insurance (PMI) in the late 1990s
and nontraditional loans in the early 2000’s.
With incomplete markets this choice becomes relevant, since households that are not down-
payment constrained might prefer a lower loan-to-value ratio by reducing the size of the loan.
A large downpayment choice χ in a ﬁxed rate mortgage loan reduces the magnitude of the
repayment schedule m(x,z) by a factor
∂m(x,z)
∂χ = − rmD0
[1−(1+rm)−N]. This choice reduces consump-
tion today but increases consumption in the future. The consumer has to consider both the
immediate impact as well as for the whole length of the mortgage. This decision with long term
contracts diﬀers from the standard housing model that uses a one-period ahead collateralized
loan. In this model the downpayment constraint is only relevant for constrained agents. With
long-term contracts all the individuals have to balance the cost and beneﬁts of the downpayment
38choice.
We explore the importance of loan-to-value choice by solving the model with diﬀerent down-
payment choices in a ﬁxed rate setting. In the ﬁrst experiment, households may choose between
a FRM with 20 and 30 percent downpayment. In the second experiment, we add a 10 percent
downpayment FRM to the choice problem. The additional downpayment choice should allow
for greater consumption smoothing. The aggregate results from the model are summarized in
Table 10.




Homeownership Rate 63.7 65.3 68.5
Share Homeowners with
No Mortgage 30.2 26.8 9.65
Mortgage 69.8 73.2 90.35
1) 10% Down - - 36.7
2) 20% Down 100 19.6 5.6
3) 30% Down - 80.4 57.7
Homeowners move 1.7 3.9 15.4
Percent upsize 97.0 86.6 60.1
Percent downsize 3.0 13.4 39.9
Homeowners do not move 98.3 96.1 84.6
Renters do not move 34.8 32.7 22.3
The model predicts that a choice over downpayments can have important quantitative eﬀects
for the homeownership rate. By allowing a household a choice between a FRM with a 20
or 30 percent downpayment requirement, the aggregate ownership rate increases by 1.6 basis
points over the no choice baseline economy. The interesting ﬁnding is that most households, 80
percent, prefer the contract with the larger downpayment. Households who prefer the 20 percent
downpayment contract are in the 20-34 and 35-49 age cohorts or are in the lowest income quintal.
We do ﬁnd that nineteen percent of 30 percent downpayment mortgages are held by the youngest
age cohort. The attractiveness of the contract with the larger downpayment is not restricted to
repeat home buyers.
A simple way to test the impact of expanding the set of downpayment choices on consumption
smoothing is to calculate the coeﬃcient of variation of consumption of goods in both economies.
The addition of an additional contract reduces this coeﬃcient from 0.113 to 0.110. These values
do not separate homeowners from renters. If we condition on housing tenure, the variation
in consumption drops 5.6 percent from 0.088 to 0.083 for homeowners. The introduction of
39additional choice increases the continuation value function for all households since it allows
more ﬂexibility in the later stages of the life cycle. The increase in downpayment options has
implications on housing transactions. As can be seen in Table 10, transaction activity doubles.
The addition of a second mortgage again reduces the fraction of households without a mortgage.
The fact that some households are not able to choose mortgages with a lower downpayment
may understate the risk sharing beneﬁts. As a result we add a third FRM contract with 10
percent downpayment into the choice problem. The model indicates that the addition of this
third contract generates a large increase in the homeownership rate. The homeownership rate
increases to 68.5 percent as compared to 63.7 in the benchmark economy and 65.8 in the two
contract choice environment. The larger set of downpayment choices, χ ∈ {0.10,0.20,0.30},
has some interesting implications for mortgage choice. We ﬁnd that 37 percent of homeowners
choose a 10 percent downpayment, 6 percent a 20 percent downpayment, and 58 prefer a 30
percent downpayment. The explanation for this choice pattern becomes transparent by looking
across the income distribution. A mortgage contract with a ten percent downpayment is the
contract of choice for individual’s in the lowest two income quintals. Of the households who
choose this contract, 96.5 percent are held by households in the lowest two income quintals.
Relatively few households hold the 20 percent product. Of those who do hold this product,
66.8 percent are in the lowest income quintal. Higher income households seem to prefer a low
loan-to-value ratio to smooth consumption.
The addition of a mortgage contract with a lower downpayment generates additional risk
sharing beneﬁts as the coeﬃcient of variation declines to 0.10 and the level of consumption in-
creases. Compared to the reduction in variance when the 30 percent downpayment is introduced
into the choice problem, the addition of a ten percent contract generates a larger beneﬁt. The
beneﬁt is captured by homeowners rather than renters as the variance of consumption falls for
homeowners, but increases for renters. The addition of this third contract results in an addi-
tional 6 percent decline in the variance of the consumption for homeowners as compared to the
two downpayment choice environment.
40Figure 4: Mobility Patterns with Downpayment Choice
20-30% Downpayment 10-20-30% Downpayment






































































































































Downpayment options do have mobility implications for homeownership. Figure 4 presents
mobility patterns when a 20 and 30 percent downpayment choice is available and then mobility
patterns when the 10 percent downpayment option is introduced. The increase in mobility that
occurs with the addition of the 10 percent contract allows many more households to enter the
market. The lower downpayment option generates a larger pattern of buyers early in the life-
cycle, but at the same time it also increases the fraction of individuals that have to sell the
property and become a renter as well as the fraction of individuals that downsize to a smaller
house. This ﬁnding is important because it shows that even in the absence of aggregate shocks
that change prices, a ﬁnancial innovation that reduces the minimum downpayment requirement
can result in increased turnover in the housing market.
6. Reﬁnancing and Mortgage Choice
In recent years the number of homeowners that have reﬁnanced their home has increased. Home-
owners have several motives for reﬁnancing their mortgages. These include better ﬁnancing
opportunities through either lower interest rates or by changing the terms of the mortgage. In
addition, some homeowners extract some equity from the property to ﬁnance consumption. In
our model the interest rate is ﬁxed, and households only realize the idiosyncratic capital gains
when they choose to sell the property, so why would they choose to reﬁnance? In the presence
of uninsurable income risk and borrowing constraints, some households that receive negative in-
come shocks could beneﬁt by switching to an alternative mortgage contract that allows income
41risk to be smoothed.28 Reﬁnancing allows households to reset their mortgage clock, and/or
change their equity position in the property. In a sense, reﬁnancing in our model is driven by
consumption smoothing through mortgage contracts. The eﬀects of consumption smoothing will
depend on the cost of reﬁnancing.
In this section, we allow a homeowner to reﬁnance their mortgage position. This option
allows a household to choose a new mortgage contract from the set of contracts Z rather than
continuing on with the existing contract. To accommodate this decision we need to modify
the household decision problem along two dimensions. One is to allow an existing homeowner
to change to a diﬀerent mortgage contract while maintaining their current housing investment
position. The other modiﬁcation is to allow a homeowner to change the equity balance in the
property when changing the mortgage contract. Formally:
• Homeowners maintains existing mortgage (z = z0):Households always have the
option of continuing with their existing contract. For households that maintain the same
mortgage contract the value function is:







π( , 0)v(a0,h 0,n− 1,z,  0,j+1 )
)
s.t. c + a0 + m(x,z0)+x(h0,s)=y(a,h0,s, ,υ j,j;q)+Ir
£
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s ≤ h0,
where n0 =m a x {N−1,0}. In this situation, the household must make a mortgage payment
if n>0. Again, it is important to remark that the decision to consume housing services
and maintenance expenses depends on the choice of paying a ﬁxed cost   to become a
landlord. The value function v1(a,h,n,z, ,j) denotes the optimal value associated with
the continuation of the existing mortgage contract.
• Homeowners reﬁnance (z 6= z0):Households that choose to reﬁnance and maybe change
their equity position must solve











28In most housing models with uninsurable income risk and one-period mortgage contracts, the household
objective is to build an optimal h/c ratio. Since accumulating the optimal house size takes time, homeowners
increase their housing stock in periods with good income shocks by borrowing. In the presence of negative income
shocks, households delay their debt repayment and do not adjust their housing consumption h
0. This mechanism
allows households to maintain a smooth consumption proﬁle. Our mechanism is somewhat diﬀerent. Homeowners
can obtain their desired house size by borrowing long-term, however, with negative income shocks since m(x,z)
and s = h
0 are ﬁxed, homeowners have to either reduce c, or pay to become a landlord Ir =1and receive
supplemental rental income.
42s.t. c + a0 + χ(z0)ph0 + m(x,z0)+x(h0,s)=y(a,h0,s, ,υ j,j;q)+Ir
£
R(h0 − s) −  
¤
+[ ph − D(n,z)],
s ≤ h0.
where v2(a,h,n,z, ,j) is the value function associated with the z0 that generates the
greatest value function from the set of mortgage contracts Z. This individual is eﬀectively
taking a new loan for the amount χ(z0)ph0 and can pull out equity amounting to [ph −
D(n,z)]. The net cost of these two diﬀerent terms determine whether the homeowners are
paying oﬀ their house faster, using some of the equity in the house to increase consumption,
or just changing the mortgage contract to have a longer maturity.
The reﬁnancing decision can be expressed as:
v(a,h,n,z, ,j)=m a x [ v1(a,h,n,z, ,j),v 2(a,h,n,z, ,j)].
Clearly, if v2(a,h,n,z, ,j) >v 1(a,h,n,z, ,j) then reﬁnancing occurs. In our formulation,
reﬁnancing is not subject to capital gains shocks. This assumption is done for computational
purposes, so we do not have to keep track of changes in the equity of the property that diﬀer
from the housing stock29 This mechanism provides an additional margin to smooth temporary
negative income shocks.
Given the strong risk sharing generated from downpayment choice, we focus our attention
on the importance of reﬁnancing in the context of downpayment choice. Following the previous
section, we assume that households have access to three diﬀerent downpayment choices χ =
{0.10,0.20,0.30}, but at any point in time they can change the mortgage loan to one with a
diﬀerent downpayment. We assume the cost of reﬁnancing is one percent of the loan value.
T a b l e1 1 :A g g r e g a t eE ﬀects of the Introduction of Reﬁnancing
Down Ownership Housing Size Properties no Share Downpayment
Simulation Payment Total 20-34 Mean Variance Mortgage 10% 20% 30%
Baseline with FRM 20% 63.7 37.5 2348 816.0 30.2 0.0 100.0 0.0
No reﬁnancing 10-20-30% 68.6 46.4 2541 949.7 9.4 36.7 6.0 57.8
Reﬁnancing 10-20-30% 69.4 46.8 2554 952.9 11.3 35.7 5.7 58.6
The introduction of reﬁnancing has additional positive eﬀects on ownership. We ﬁnd that the
homeownership rates increase from 68.6 percent to 69.4 percent when households have access to
reﬁnancing options. For households in the 20-34 age range, homeownership rates increase from
46.4 to 47.6 percent. This suggests that in the absence of interest rate risk (or interest rate
movements), the option to purchase a house with a low downpayment is more important for
ownership than the reﬁnancing option for ﬁrst time buyers. From a distributional perspective,
29This assumption prevents households from pulling out equity associated with capital gains. Since in the model
we do not have aggregate shocks, the transitory shocks should not have an eﬀect on the homeowners ability to
take on more debt.
43the reﬁnancing option does not seem to have implications for the mortgage contract choice. We
ﬁnd that households who receive positive income shocks reﬁnance their mortgage position by
choosing mortgage contracts with lower loan-to-value ratios. This behavior appears two ways.
First, the number of properties without a mortgage increases by 2 percent when reﬁnancing is
allowed. Second, the ﬁnal column of Table11 reveals that the share of homeowners that choose
30 percent downpayment increases when reﬁnancing is an option. Households are showing a
tendency of wanting to build equity or pay oﬀ their mortgage debt quickly.
Table 12: Mortgage Switching Matrix
Future Mortgage Choice
Current Mortgage Choice 10% 20% 30% Total
10 percent 1.2 5.9 36.0 43.1
20 percent 2.7 11.7 1.6 16.0
30 percent 0.0 4.1 36.9 41.0
Total 3.9 21.7 74.5 100
To understand the dynamics of reﬁnancing, we look at the mobility patterns of mortgage
switching. The model predicts that 34.8 percent of the homeowners and roughly 50 percent
of the households that stay in the house choose to reﬁnance. The distribution of reﬁnancing
suggests that the majority of homeowners move to options with higher downpayments, and only
a very small fraction of households choose to move into a mortgage with a lower downpayment
requirement. The mobility matrix is summarized in Table 12 where the rows indicate the original
mortgage type, z, while the columns denote the new mortgage type chosen, z0. The diagonal
values in each matrix represent the fraction of homeowners that choose to maintain the existing
mortgage loan. In the model households are allowed to reﬁnance using the same mortgage
contract, as a result the diagonals could contain two diﬀerent types of individuals. However, the
mass of individuals that reﬁnance using the same mortgage is zero in the model. For example,
consider the 43.1 percent of the homeowners who choose to reﬁnance, starting with a mortgage
that has a ten percent downpayment. Of these households, over 75 percent choose to reﬁnance
with a 30 percent downpayment. This result indicates that younger and poorer households use
a low downpayment mortgage to enter the housing market, and then reﬁnance with loans that
have a higher downpayment requirement and lower payments. The 16.0 percent of households
w h oc h o o s et or e ﬁnance with a twenty percent downpayment tend to be the only cohort that
does not favor the 30 percent downpayment. They tend to simply reset their mortgage with the
same downpayment to gain access to equity. The large number of households who start with a
thirty percent downpayment mortgage and reﬁnance to a similar contract are also likely gaining
access to equity.
44Table 13: Summary Measures for Housing Transactions
Homeowners Entry, Exit, and Stay
Contract Type1 Move % Upsize % Downsize Rent to Own Own to Rent Rent to Rent
Baseline(FRM) 1.7 97.0 3.0 6.0 1.5 34.8
No reﬁnancing 15.9 59.3 40.7 13.7 9.1 22.3
Reﬁnancing 14.4 61.5 38.5 13.1 8.4 22.2
The presence of a reﬁnancing option oﬀers homeowners an alternative way to smooth positive
and negative income shocks as they can better use the equity on the property as partial insurance
against income risk. This is especially important for those individuals that purchase a property
using their asset holdings to meet the downpayment requirement. These individuals are likely
to be more vulnerable to risk. In the absence of reﬁnancing, a negative income shock might
force a household to sell their the house, or pay the ﬁxed cost and rent the property. With
reﬁnancing, an existing homeowner can extract equity from the house or change the terms of
the mortgage and avoid selling the property. As a result, mobility should be reduced. However,
the option of reﬁnancing should make owner-occupied housing more attractive to a prospective
homeowner, thus increasing mobility. Table 13 examines how housing transactions are aﬀected
by reﬁnancing. The model ﬁnds that reﬁnancing reduces mobility as the number of homeowners
who do not move increases. Of the households who do move, downsizing activity is reduced
but some upsizing of houses does occur. This is due to the fact that reﬁnancing provides
some insurance to households that choose to buy larger houses. In addition, we observe that the
fraction of individuals that choose to exit the housing market is reduced roughly 8 percent. Since
individuals leave the ownership state less often than the fraction of individuals that transit in,
mobility is also reduced. This suggests that most homeowners use reﬁnancing as an insurance
against negative income shocks. Next, we decompose the eﬀects of reﬁnancing by looking at the
variability of consumption and housing services.
Table 14: Eﬀects of Mortgage Choice on Risk Sharing
Coeﬃcient Variation
Consumption Consumption Housing
Simulation Growth1 Total Owner Renters Total Owner Renters
Baseline with FRM - 0.11 0.09 0.29 0.49 0.29 3.13
No Reﬁnancing 0.45% 0.10 0.08 0.25 0.45 0.25 2.74
Costly Reﬁnancing 1.00% 0.10 0.08 0.26 0.42 0.24 2.82
1Percentage change in aggregate consumption with respect baseline
Table 14 measures the consumption smoothing beneﬁts from reﬁnancing. The eﬀects of
reﬁnancing in the coeﬃcient of variation in consumption and housing could fall depending on
the cost. In the absence of reﬁnancing, but including downpayment choices, the coeﬃcient of
variation in consumption is reduced from 0.11 to 0.10. If we condition on ownership, the reduc-
tion is of a similar magnitude. The introduction of reﬁnancing has no quantitative eﬀect in the
variation of consumption, but it reduces the dispersion in housing consumption. For the average
45individual the reduction is 14 percent and 17 percent for homeowners. This is mainly accounted
for by the ﬁndings of Table 13 that suggest that the introduction of reﬁnancing reduces the frac-
tion of individuals that are forced to leave the owner-occupied housing market. Since housing
is a luxury good, in the model, it appears that individuals receive a larger payoﬀ by smoothing
the consumption of this good. This can be partially explained by the preference speciﬁcation
that assumes that consumption and housing services are imperfect substitutes. With a diﬀerent
elasticity between consumption goods and housing services, or with a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of
preferences (i.e. homothetic preferences for consumption and housing) the adjustment might be
similar in both commodities. However, the objective of the paper is to illustrate the impact of
reﬁnancing in mortgage choice, and not to measure the impact in risk sharing. The transmission
mechanism in the aggregate economy suggests that reﬁnancing should increase the aggregate
consumption between 1 to 1.5 percent when compared to the baseline economy and between 0.5
to 1 percent when compared to the downpayment choice baseline. That suggests that the eﬀects
of reﬁnancing are large even in the absence of interest rate movements and house appreciation.
7. Conclusions
A goal of current U.S. housing policy is to increase the homeownership rate. One tool used
to achieve this goal has been the reduction in ﬁnancial restrictions which has lead to greater
ﬂexibility in mortgage contracts oﬀered in the market. This paper explores the implications
of several diﬀerent mortgage contracts for tenure and housing investment decisions, and thus
the homeownership rate. The analysis was conducted using a quantitative equilibrium model
with heterogeneous consumers and liquidity constraints. Our life cycle model is characterized
by considering the housing decision as part of the portfolio decision, and allowing households to
make discrete choices of whether to own, rent or lease.
The model presents several contributions in thel i t e r a t u r eo fm o r t g a g ec h o i c et h a tm a i n l y
uses complete markets models to determine the choice between FRM and ARM. In the paper we
show that the introduction of long-term mortgage decisions has a positive eﬀect on ownership
and housing consumption, but the magnitude depends on the proﬁle of the repayment schedule
and the downpayment. We ﬁnd that contracts with increasing repayment proﬁles generate
similar aggregate eﬀects as that of no downpayment loans. However, the distributional eﬀects
on participation and housing transactions are diﬀerent.
We ﬁnd that the optimal mortgage choice varies across many individual dimensions such
as income and age. For example, when downpayments requirements are high, young and poor
individuals beneﬁt from using mortgage loans with an increasing repayment proﬁle since the
initial cost of purchase a house is reduced. By contrast, individuals with more income or of
an older age prefer mortgages with high downpayment and fast amortization of the principal.
We show that a very close substitute to loans with increasing repayment schedules for young
and poor individuals are loans with no downpayment and decreasing repayments. The model
predicts that the choice of nontraditional loans with low initial payments or no downpayments
46has an important impact in mobility and it also reduces consumption smoothing.
Our analysis suggests a number of extensions that we are presently investigating. In our
model homeowners that cannot aﬀord to meet the payments without violating the non negativity
constraint in consumption and are forced to sell. However, this ﬁnding suggests a model that
allows foreclosures when equity is less that the remaining mortgage debt could be useful to
understand episodes of housing default. This is especially true in an environment with stagnant
or declining house prices. The model also suggests that mortgage choice is a very complicated
subject, and while it would be very useful to have a positive theory of mortgage contracts, the
heterogeneity in the decisions as well as the multiple dimensions that mortgage contracts have
(i.e., downpayment, amortization schedule, repayment proﬁle) makes it diﬃcult.
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498. Appendix: Deﬁnition of Recursive Stationary Equilibrium
We restrict ourselves to stationary equilibria. The individual state variables are asset holdings,
a, housing investment holdings, h, mortgage contract type, z, mortgage status, n, labor produc-
tivity status,  , and age. The individual state of the economy is completely described by the joint
measure Φ over asset positions, housing investment positions, mortgage contract type, mortgage
status, productivity state, and age where Λ =( a,h,z,n, ,j). Let a ∈ A ⊂ R+,h∈ H ⊂ R+,
z∈ Z ⊂I,n ∈ N =( 1 ,2,...,N) ∈ I,   ∈ E = { 1,  2,  3,  4,  5} ⊂ I, j ∈ J =( 1 ,2,...,J) ⊂ I, and
let S = R+ × R+ ×Z×N×E×J.
Deﬁnition (Stationary Equilibrium): Let deﬁne Is to be an indicator function that is
equal to one when a housing investment position is sold and zero otherwise. Given a set of time-
invariant ﬁscal policy arrangements {G,τy(η0,η 1,η 2),τ p(θ)}, and initial conditions, a stationary
equilibrium is a collection of value functions, v(a,h,z,n, ,j,): A×H×Z×M×E×J → R;
and decision rules for the household, {a0,h 0,z0,c,s : S → R+} if Is =0or {a0
ξ,h 0
ξ,z0
ξ,c ξ,s ξ :
S → R+} if Is =1 , aggregate outcomes {K,N}; prices {r,p,R,rm}; stationary population and
invariant distribution Φ(a,h,z,n, ,j) such that
1. Given prices, {r,p,R,rm}, policies, transfers, and initial conditions, the value function v
and decision rules c, s, a0, and h0 solve the consumer’s problem as speciﬁed in equations
(3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8).
2. Transfers are deﬁned in equation (3.11).
3. The asset market is deﬁned by equation (3.14) clears.
4. The rental market as deﬁned by equation (3.15) clears.
5. The goods market condition is deﬁned as:
C + K0 − (1 − δ)K + IH + G + Υ = F(K,N)
where C, K0 − (1 − δ)K, IH, G, Υ represent aggregate consumption expenditures, ag-
gregate investment in ﬁxed capital, aggregate investment in housing goods, government


































































6. The labor market clears where labor demand, as determined by the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order
condition, is equal to labor supply.
7. The general government balances as speciﬁed by equation (3.9).
8. The social security program is self-ﬁnancing with the tax rate determined by equation
(3.10).
9. Letting T be an operator which maps the set of distributions into itself aggregation requires
Φ0(a0,h 0,z,n− 1,  0,j+1 )=T(Φ),
and T be consistent with individual decisions. We will restrict ourselves to equilibria which
satisfy:
Φ0 = T(Φ)
where the function T : M → M.
51